Revert "ima: limit file hash setting by user to fix and log modes"

commit f5acb3dcba1ffb7f0b8cbb9dba61500eea5d610b upstream.

Userspace applications have been modified to write security xattrs,
but they are not context aware.  In the case of security.ima, the
security xattr can be either a file hash or a file signature.
Permitting writing one, but not the other requires the application to
be context aware.

In addition, userspace applications might write files to a staging
area, which might not be in policy, and then change some file metadata
(eg. owner) making it in policy.  As a result, these files are not
labeled properly.

This reverts commit c68ed80c97d9720f51ef31fe91560fdd1e121533, which
prevents writing file hashes as security.ima xattrs.

Requested-by: Patrick Ohly <patrick.ohly@intel.com>
Cc: Dmitry Kasatkin <dmitry.kasatkin@gmail.com>
Signed-off-by: Mimi Zohar <zohar@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Cc: Mike Rapoport <rppt@linux.vnet.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Greg Kroah-Hartman <gregkh@linuxfoundation.org>

1 files changed, 2 insertions, 6 deletions

diff --git a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
index 7bf8b00..1e6f23f7 100644
--- a/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
+++ b/security/integrity/ima/ima_appraise.c
@@ -389,14 +389,10 @@ int ima_inode_setxattr(struct dentry *dentry, const char *xattr_name,
 	result = ima_protect_xattr(dentry, xattr_name, xattr_value,
 				   xattr_value_len);
 	if (result == 1) {
-		bool digsig;
-
 		if (!xattr_value_len || (xvalue->type >= IMA_XATTR_LAST))
 			return -EINVAL;
-		digsig = (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG);
-		if (!digsig && (ima_appraise & IMA_APPRAISE_ENFORCE))
-			return -EPERM;
-		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry), digsig);
+		ima_reset_appraise_flags(d_backing_inode(dentry),
+			 (xvalue->type == EVM_IMA_XATTR_DIGSIG) ? 1 : 0);
 		result = 0;
 	}
 	return result;