blob: 42b7251c597fb492261c1cc4b4df134fa4a9a03d
1 | /* auditfilter.c -- filtering of audit events |
2 | * |
3 | * Copyright 2003-2004 Red Hat, Inc. |
4 | * Copyright 2005 Hewlett-Packard Development Company, L.P. |
5 | * Copyright 2005 IBM Corporation |
6 | * |
7 | * This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify |
8 | * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by |
9 | * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or |
10 | * (at your option) any later version. |
11 | * |
12 | * This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, |
13 | * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of |
14 | * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the |
15 | * GNU General Public License for more details. |
16 | * |
17 | * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License |
18 | * along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software |
19 | * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place, Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307 USA |
20 | */ |
21 | |
22 | #define pr_fmt(fmt) KBUILD_MODNAME ": " fmt |
23 | |
24 | #include <linux/kernel.h> |
25 | #include <linux/audit.h> |
26 | #include <linux/kthread.h> |
27 | #include <linux/mutex.h> |
28 | #include <linux/fs.h> |
29 | #include <linux/namei.h> |
30 | #include <linux/netlink.h> |
31 | #include <linux/sched.h> |
32 | #include <linux/slab.h> |
33 | #include <linux/security.h> |
34 | #include <net/net_namespace.h> |
35 | #include <net/sock.h> |
36 | #include "audit.h" |
37 | |
38 | /* |
39 | * Locking model: |
40 | * |
41 | * audit_filter_mutex: |
42 | * Synchronizes writes and blocking reads of audit's filterlist |
43 | * data. Rcu is used to traverse the filterlist and access |
44 | * contents of structs audit_entry, audit_watch and opaque |
45 | * LSM rules during filtering. If modified, these structures |
46 | * must be copied and replace their counterparts in the filterlist. |
47 | * An audit_parent struct is not accessed during filtering, so may |
48 | * be written directly provided audit_filter_mutex is held. |
49 | */ |
50 | |
51 | /* Audit filter lists, defined in <linux/audit.h> */ |
52 | struct list_head audit_filter_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { |
53 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[0]), |
54 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[1]), |
55 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[2]), |
56 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[3]), |
57 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[4]), |
58 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_filter_list[5]), |
59 | #if AUDIT_NR_FILTERS != 6 |
60 | #error Fix audit_filter_list initialiser |
61 | #endif |
62 | }; |
63 | static struct list_head audit_rules_list[AUDIT_NR_FILTERS] = { |
64 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[0]), |
65 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[1]), |
66 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[2]), |
67 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[3]), |
68 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[4]), |
69 | LIST_HEAD_INIT(audit_rules_list[5]), |
70 | }; |
71 | |
72 | DEFINE_MUTEX(audit_filter_mutex); |
73 | |
74 | static void audit_free_lsm_field(struct audit_field *f) |
75 | { |
76 | switch (f->type) { |
77 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: |
78 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: |
79 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: |
80 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: |
81 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: |
82 | case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: |
83 | case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: |
84 | case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: |
85 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: |
86 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: |
87 | kfree(f->lsm_str); |
88 | security_audit_rule_free(f->lsm_rule); |
89 | } |
90 | } |
91 | |
92 | static inline void audit_free_rule(struct audit_entry *e) |
93 | { |
94 | int i; |
95 | struct audit_krule *erule = &e->rule; |
96 | |
97 | /* some rules don't have associated watches */ |
98 | if (erule->watch) |
99 | audit_put_watch(erule->watch); |
100 | if (erule->fields) |
101 | for (i = 0; i < erule->field_count; i++) |
102 | audit_free_lsm_field(&erule->fields[i]); |
103 | kfree(erule->fields); |
104 | kfree(erule->filterkey); |
105 | kfree(e); |
106 | } |
107 | |
108 | void audit_free_rule_rcu(struct rcu_head *head) |
109 | { |
110 | struct audit_entry *e = container_of(head, struct audit_entry, rcu); |
111 | audit_free_rule(e); |
112 | } |
113 | |
114 | /* Initialize an audit filterlist entry. */ |
115 | static inline struct audit_entry *audit_init_entry(u32 field_count) |
116 | { |
117 | struct audit_entry *entry; |
118 | struct audit_field *fields; |
119 | |
120 | entry = kzalloc(sizeof(*entry), GFP_KERNEL); |
121 | if (unlikely(!entry)) |
122 | return NULL; |
123 | |
124 | fields = kcalloc(field_count, sizeof(*fields), GFP_KERNEL); |
125 | if (unlikely(!fields)) { |
126 | kfree(entry); |
127 | return NULL; |
128 | } |
129 | entry->rule.fields = fields; |
130 | |
131 | return entry; |
132 | } |
133 | |
134 | /* Unpack a filter field's string representation from user-space |
135 | * buffer. */ |
136 | char *audit_unpack_string(void **bufp, size_t *remain, size_t len) |
137 | { |
138 | char *str; |
139 | |
140 | if (!*bufp || (len == 0) || (len > *remain)) |
141 | return ERR_PTR(-EINVAL); |
142 | |
143 | /* Of the currently implemented string fields, PATH_MAX |
144 | * defines the longest valid length. |
145 | */ |
146 | if (len > PATH_MAX) |
147 | return ERR_PTR(-ENAMETOOLONG); |
148 | |
149 | str = kmalloc(len + 1, GFP_KERNEL); |
150 | if (unlikely(!str)) |
151 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); |
152 | |
153 | memcpy(str, *bufp, len); |
154 | str[len] = 0; |
155 | *bufp += len; |
156 | *remain -= len; |
157 | |
158 | return str; |
159 | } |
160 | |
161 | /* Translate an inode field to kernel representation. */ |
162 | static inline int audit_to_inode(struct audit_krule *krule, |
163 | struct audit_field *f) |
164 | { |
165 | if (krule->listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT || |
166 | krule->inode_f || krule->watch || krule->tree || |
167 | (f->op != Audit_equal && f->op != Audit_not_equal)) |
168 | return -EINVAL; |
169 | |
170 | krule->inode_f = f; |
171 | return 0; |
172 | } |
173 | |
174 | static __u32 *classes[AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES]; |
175 | |
176 | int __init audit_register_class(int class, unsigned *list) |
177 | { |
178 | __u32 *p = kcalloc(AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE, sizeof(__u32), GFP_KERNEL); |
179 | if (!p) |
180 | return -ENOMEM; |
181 | while (*list != ~0U) { |
182 | unsigned n = *list++; |
183 | if (n >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES) { |
184 | kfree(p); |
185 | return -EINVAL; |
186 | } |
187 | p[AUDIT_WORD(n)] |= AUDIT_BIT(n); |
188 | } |
189 | if (class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || classes[class]) { |
190 | kfree(p); |
191 | return -EINVAL; |
192 | } |
193 | classes[class] = p; |
194 | return 0; |
195 | } |
196 | |
197 | int audit_match_class(int class, unsigned syscall) |
198 | { |
199 | if (unlikely(syscall >= AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32)) |
200 | return 0; |
201 | if (unlikely(class >= AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES || !classes[class])) |
202 | return 0; |
203 | return classes[class][AUDIT_WORD(syscall)] & AUDIT_BIT(syscall); |
204 | } |
205 | |
206 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL |
207 | static inline int audit_match_class_bits(int class, u32 *mask) |
208 | { |
209 | int i; |
210 | |
211 | if (classes[class]) { |
212 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) |
213 | if (mask[i] & classes[class][i]) |
214 | return 0; |
215 | } |
216 | return 1; |
217 | } |
218 | |
219 | static int audit_match_signal(struct audit_entry *entry) |
220 | { |
221 | struct audit_field *arch = entry->rule.arch_f; |
222 | |
223 | if (!arch) { |
224 | /* When arch is unspecified, we must check both masks on biarch |
225 | * as syscall number alone is ambiguous. */ |
226 | return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL, |
227 | entry->rule.mask) && |
228 | audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32, |
229 | entry->rule.mask)); |
230 | } |
231 | |
232 | switch(audit_classify_arch(arch->val)) { |
233 | case 0: /* native */ |
234 | return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL, |
235 | entry->rule.mask)); |
236 | case 1: /* 32bit on biarch */ |
237 | return (audit_match_class_bits(AUDIT_CLASS_SIGNAL_32, |
238 | entry->rule.mask)); |
239 | default: |
240 | return 1; |
241 | } |
242 | } |
243 | #endif |
244 | |
245 | /* Common user-space to kernel rule translation. */ |
246 | static inline struct audit_entry *audit_to_entry_common(struct audit_rule_data *rule) |
247 | { |
248 | unsigned listnr; |
249 | struct audit_entry *entry; |
250 | int i, err; |
251 | |
252 | err = -EINVAL; |
253 | listnr = rule->flags & ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; |
254 | switch(listnr) { |
255 | default: |
256 | goto exit_err; |
257 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL |
258 | case AUDIT_FILTER_ENTRY: |
259 | if (rule->action == AUDIT_ALWAYS) |
260 | goto exit_err; |
261 | case AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT: |
262 | case AUDIT_FILTER_TASK: |
263 | #endif |
264 | case AUDIT_FILTER_USER: |
265 | case AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE: |
266 | ; |
267 | } |
268 | if (unlikely(rule->action == AUDIT_POSSIBLE)) { |
269 | pr_err("AUDIT_POSSIBLE is deprecated\n"); |
270 | goto exit_err; |
271 | } |
272 | if (rule->action != AUDIT_NEVER && rule->action != AUDIT_ALWAYS) |
273 | goto exit_err; |
274 | if (rule->field_count > AUDIT_MAX_FIELDS) |
275 | goto exit_err; |
276 | |
277 | err = -ENOMEM; |
278 | entry = audit_init_entry(rule->field_count); |
279 | if (!entry) |
280 | goto exit_err; |
281 | |
282 | entry->rule.flags = rule->flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; |
283 | entry->rule.listnr = listnr; |
284 | entry->rule.action = rule->action; |
285 | entry->rule.field_count = rule->field_count; |
286 | |
287 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) |
288 | entry->rule.mask[i] = rule->mask[i]; |
289 | |
290 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_SYSCALL_CLASSES; i++) { |
291 | int bit = AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE * 32 - i - 1; |
292 | __u32 *p = &entry->rule.mask[AUDIT_WORD(bit)]; |
293 | __u32 *class; |
294 | |
295 | if (!(*p & AUDIT_BIT(bit))) |
296 | continue; |
297 | *p &= ~AUDIT_BIT(bit); |
298 | class = classes[i]; |
299 | if (class) { |
300 | int j; |
301 | for (j = 0; j < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; j++) |
302 | entry->rule.mask[j] |= class[j]; |
303 | } |
304 | } |
305 | |
306 | return entry; |
307 | |
308 | exit_err: |
309 | return ERR_PTR(err); |
310 | } |
311 | |
312 | static u32 audit_ops[] = |
313 | { |
314 | [Audit_equal] = AUDIT_EQUAL, |
315 | [Audit_not_equal] = AUDIT_NOT_EQUAL, |
316 | [Audit_bitmask] = AUDIT_BIT_MASK, |
317 | [Audit_bittest] = AUDIT_BIT_TEST, |
318 | [Audit_lt] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN, |
319 | [Audit_gt] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN, |
320 | [Audit_le] = AUDIT_LESS_THAN_OR_EQUAL, |
321 | [Audit_ge] = AUDIT_GREATER_THAN_OR_EQUAL, |
322 | }; |
323 | |
324 | static u32 audit_to_op(u32 op) |
325 | { |
326 | u32 n; |
327 | for (n = Audit_equal; n < Audit_bad && audit_ops[n] != op; n++) |
328 | ; |
329 | return n; |
330 | } |
331 | |
332 | /* check if an audit field is valid */ |
333 | static int audit_field_valid(struct audit_entry *entry, struct audit_field *f) |
334 | { |
335 | switch(f->type) { |
336 | case AUDIT_MSGTYPE: |
337 | if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE && |
338 | entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_USER) |
339 | return -EINVAL; |
340 | break; |
341 | }; |
342 | |
343 | switch(f->type) { |
344 | default: |
345 | return -EINVAL; |
346 | case AUDIT_UID: |
347 | case AUDIT_EUID: |
348 | case AUDIT_SUID: |
349 | case AUDIT_FSUID: |
350 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: |
351 | case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: |
352 | case AUDIT_GID: |
353 | case AUDIT_EGID: |
354 | case AUDIT_SGID: |
355 | case AUDIT_FSGID: |
356 | case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: |
357 | case AUDIT_PID: |
358 | case AUDIT_PERS: |
359 | case AUDIT_MSGTYPE: |
360 | case AUDIT_PPID: |
361 | case AUDIT_DEVMAJOR: |
362 | case AUDIT_DEVMINOR: |
363 | case AUDIT_EXIT: |
364 | case AUDIT_SUCCESS: |
365 | case AUDIT_INODE: |
366 | /* bit ops are only useful on syscall args */ |
367 | if (f->op == Audit_bitmask || f->op == Audit_bittest) |
368 | return -EINVAL; |
369 | break; |
370 | case AUDIT_ARG0: |
371 | case AUDIT_ARG1: |
372 | case AUDIT_ARG2: |
373 | case AUDIT_ARG3: |
374 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: |
375 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: |
376 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: |
377 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: |
378 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: |
379 | case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: |
380 | case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: |
381 | case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: |
382 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: |
383 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: |
384 | case AUDIT_WATCH: |
385 | case AUDIT_DIR: |
386 | case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: |
387 | break; |
388 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: |
389 | if ((f->val != 0) && (f->val != 1)) |
390 | return -EINVAL; |
391 | /* FALL THROUGH */ |
392 | case AUDIT_ARCH: |
393 | if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal) |
394 | return -EINVAL; |
395 | break; |
396 | case AUDIT_PERM: |
397 | if (f->val & ~15) |
398 | return -EINVAL; |
399 | break; |
400 | case AUDIT_FILETYPE: |
401 | if (f->val & ~S_IFMT) |
402 | return -EINVAL; |
403 | break; |
404 | case AUDIT_FIELD_COMPARE: |
405 | if (f->val > AUDIT_MAX_FIELD_COMPARE) |
406 | return -EINVAL; |
407 | break; |
408 | case AUDIT_EXE: |
409 | if (f->op != Audit_not_equal && f->op != Audit_equal) |
410 | return -EINVAL; |
411 | if (entry->rule.listnr != AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT) |
412 | return -EINVAL; |
413 | break; |
414 | }; |
415 | return 0; |
416 | } |
417 | |
418 | /* Translate struct audit_rule_data to kernel's rule representation. */ |
419 | static struct audit_entry *audit_data_to_entry(struct audit_rule_data *data, |
420 | size_t datasz) |
421 | { |
422 | int err = 0; |
423 | struct audit_entry *entry; |
424 | void *bufp; |
425 | size_t remain = datasz - sizeof(struct audit_rule_data); |
426 | int i; |
427 | char *str; |
428 | struct audit_fsnotify_mark *audit_mark; |
429 | |
430 | entry = audit_to_entry_common(data); |
431 | if (IS_ERR(entry)) |
432 | goto exit_nofree; |
433 | |
434 | bufp = data->buf; |
435 | for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) { |
436 | struct audit_field *f = &entry->rule.fields[i]; |
437 | |
438 | err = -EINVAL; |
439 | |
440 | f->op = audit_to_op(data->fieldflags[i]); |
441 | if (f->op == Audit_bad) |
442 | goto exit_free; |
443 | |
444 | f->type = data->fields[i]; |
445 | f->val = data->values[i]; |
446 | |
447 | /* Support legacy tests for a valid loginuid */ |
448 | if ((f->type == AUDIT_LOGINUID) && (f->val == AUDIT_UID_UNSET)) { |
449 | f->type = AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET; |
450 | f->val = 0; |
451 | entry->rule.pflags |= AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY; |
452 | } |
453 | |
454 | err = audit_field_valid(entry, f); |
455 | if (err) |
456 | goto exit_free; |
457 | |
458 | err = -EINVAL; |
459 | switch (f->type) { |
460 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: |
461 | case AUDIT_UID: |
462 | case AUDIT_EUID: |
463 | case AUDIT_SUID: |
464 | case AUDIT_FSUID: |
465 | case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: |
466 | f->uid = make_kuid(current_user_ns(), f->val); |
467 | if (!uid_valid(f->uid)) |
468 | goto exit_free; |
469 | break; |
470 | case AUDIT_GID: |
471 | case AUDIT_EGID: |
472 | case AUDIT_SGID: |
473 | case AUDIT_FSGID: |
474 | case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: |
475 | f->gid = make_kgid(current_user_ns(), f->val); |
476 | if (!gid_valid(f->gid)) |
477 | goto exit_free; |
478 | break; |
479 | case AUDIT_ARCH: |
480 | entry->rule.arch_f = f; |
481 | break; |
482 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: |
483 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: |
484 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: |
485 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: |
486 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: |
487 | case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: |
488 | case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: |
489 | case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: |
490 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: |
491 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: |
492 | str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); |
493 | if (IS_ERR(str)) |
494 | goto exit_free; |
495 | entry->rule.buflen += f->val; |
496 | |
497 | err = security_audit_rule_init(f->type, f->op, str, |
498 | (void **)&f->lsm_rule); |
499 | /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they |
500 | * become valid after a policy reload. */ |
501 | if (err == -EINVAL) { |
502 | pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n", |
503 | str); |
504 | err = 0; |
505 | } |
506 | if (err) { |
507 | kfree(str); |
508 | goto exit_free; |
509 | } else |
510 | f->lsm_str = str; |
511 | break; |
512 | case AUDIT_WATCH: |
513 | str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); |
514 | if (IS_ERR(str)) |
515 | goto exit_free; |
516 | entry->rule.buflen += f->val; |
517 | |
518 | err = audit_to_watch(&entry->rule, str, f->val, f->op); |
519 | if (err) { |
520 | kfree(str); |
521 | goto exit_free; |
522 | } |
523 | break; |
524 | case AUDIT_DIR: |
525 | str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); |
526 | if (IS_ERR(str)) |
527 | goto exit_free; |
528 | entry->rule.buflen += f->val; |
529 | |
530 | err = audit_make_tree(&entry->rule, str, f->op); |
531 | kfree(str); |
532 | if (err) |
533 | goto exit_free; |
534 | break; |
535 | case AUDIT_INODE: |
536 | err = audit_to_inode(&entry->rule, f); |
537 | if (err) |
538 | goto exit_free; |
539 | break; |
540 | case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: |
541 | if (entry->rule.filterkey || f->val > AUDIT_MAX_KEY_LEN) |
542 | goto exit_free; |
543 | str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); |
544 | if (IS_ERR(str)) |
545 | goto exit_free; |
546 | entry->rule.buflen += f->val; |
547 | entry->rule.filterkey = str; |
548 | break; |
549 | case AUDIT_EXE: |
550 | if (entry->rule.exe || f->val > PATH_MAX) |
551 | goto exit_free; |
552 | str = audit_unpack_string(&bufp, &remain, f->val); |
553 | if (IS_ERR(str)) { |
554 | err = PTR_ERR(str); |
555 | goto exit_free; |
556 | } |
557 | entry->rule.buflen += f->val; |
558 | |
559 | audit_mark = audit_alloc_mark(&entry->rule, str, f->val); |
560 | if (IS_ERR(audit_mark)) { |
561 | kfree(str); |
562 | err = PTR_ERR(audit_mark); |
563 | goto exit_free; |
564 | } |
565 | entry->rule.exe = audit_mark; |
566 | break; |
567 | } |
568 | } |
569 | |
570 | if (entry->rule.inode_f && entry->rule.inode_f->op == Audit_not_equal) |
571 | entry->rule.inode_f = NULL; |
572 | |
573 | exit_nofree: |
574 | return entry; |
575 | |
576 | exit_free: |
577 | if (entry->rule.tree) |
578 | audit_put_tree(entry->rule.tree); /* that's the temporary one */ |
579 | if (entry->rule.exe) |
580 | audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); /* that's the template one */ |
581 | audit_free_rule(entry); |
582 | return ERR_PTR(err); |
583 | } |
584 | |
585 | /* Pack a filter field's string representation into data block. */ |
586 | static inline size_t audit_pack_string(void **bufp, const char *str) |
587 | { |
588 | size_t len = strlen(str); |
589 | |
590 | memcpy(*bufp, str, len); |
591 | *bufp += len; |
592 | |
593 | return len; |
594 | } |
595 | |
596 | /* Translate kernel rule representation to struct audit_rule_data. */ |
597 | static struct audit_rule_data *audit_krule_to_data(struct audit_krule *krule) |
598 | { |
599 | struct audit_rule_data *data; |
600 | void *bufp; |
601 | int i; |
602 | |
603 | data = kmalloc(sizeof(*data) + krule->buflen, GFP_KERNEL); |
604 | if (unlikely(!data)) |
605 | return NULL; |
606 | memset(data, 0, sizeof(*data)); |
607 | |
608 | data->flags = krule->flags | krule->listnr; |
609 | data->action = krule->action; |
610 | data->field_count = krule->field_count; |
611 | bufp = data->buf; |
612 | for (i = 0; i < data->field_count; i++) { |
613 | struct audit_field *f = &krule->fields[i]; |
614 | |
615 | data->fields[i] = f->type; |
616 | data->fieldflags[i] = audit_ops[f->op]; |
617 | switch(f->type) { |
618 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: |
619 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: |
620 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: |
621 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: |
622 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: |
623 | case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: |
624 | case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: |
625 | case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: |
626 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: |
627 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: |
628 | data->buflen += data->values[i] = |
629 | audit_pack_string(&bufp, f->lsm_str); |
630 | break; |
631 | case AUDIT_WATCH: |
632 | data->buflen += data->values[i] = |
633 | audit_pack_string(&bufp, |
634 | audit_watch_path(krule->watch)); |
635 | break; |
636 | case AUDIT_DIR: |
637 | data->buflen += data->values[i] = |
638 | audit_pack_string(&bufp, |
639 | audit_tree_path(krule->tree)); |
640 | break; |
641 | case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: |
642 | data->buflen += data->values[i] = |
643 | audit_pack_string(&bufp, krule->filterkey); |
644 | break; |
645 | case AUDIT_EXE: |
646 | data->buflen += data->values[i] = |
647 | audit_pack_string(&bufp, audit_mark_path(krule->exe)); |
648 | break; |
649 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: |
650 | if (krule->pflags & AUDIT_LOGINUID_LEGACY && !f->val) { |
651 | data->fields[i] = AUDIT_LOGINUID; |
652 | data->values[i] = AUDIT_UID_UNSET; |
653 | break; |
654 | } |
655 | /* fallthrough if set */ |
656 | default: |
657 | data->values[i] = f->val; |
658 | } |
659 | } |
660 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) data->mask[i] = krule->mask[i]; |
661 | |
662 | return data; |
663 | } |
664 | |
665 | /* Compare two rules in kernel format. Considered success if rules |
666 | * don't match. */ |
667 | static int audit_compare_rule(struct audit_krule *a, struct audit_krule *b) |
668 | { |
669 | int i; |
670 | |
671 | if (a->flags != b->flags || |
672 | a->pflags != b->pflags || |
673 | a->listnr != b->listnr || |
674 | a->action != b->action || |
675 | a->field_count != b->field_count) |
676 | return 1; |
677 | |
678 | for (i = 0; i < a->field_count; i++) { |
679 | if (a->fields[i].type != b->fields[i].type || |
680 | a->fields[i].op != b->fields[i].op) |
681 | return 1; |
682 | |
683 | switch(a->fields[i].type) { |
684 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: |
685 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: |
686 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: |
687 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: |
688 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: |
689 | case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: |
690 | case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: |
691 | case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: |
692 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: |
693 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: |
694 | if (strcmp(a->fields[i].lsm_str, b->fields[i].lsm_str)) |
695 | return 1; |
696 | break; |
697 | case AUDIT_WATCH: |
698 | if (strcmp(audit_watch_path(a->watch), |
699 | audit_watch_path(b->watch))) |
700 | return 1; |
701 | break; |
702 | case AUDIT_DIR: |
703 | if (strcmp(audit_tree_path(a->tree), |
704 | audit_tree_path(b->tree))) |
705 | return 1; |
706 | break; |
707 | case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: |
708 | /* both filterkeys exist based on above type compare */ |
709 | if (strcmp(a->filterkey, b->filterkey)) |
710 | return 1; |
711 | break; |
712 | case AUDIT_EXE: |
713 | /* both paths exist based on above type compare */ |
714 | if (strcmp(audit_mark_path(a->exe), |
715 | audit_mark_path(b->exe))) |
716 | return 1; |
717 | break; |
718 | case AUDIT_UID: |
719 | case AUDIT_EUID: |
720 | case AUDIT_SUID: |
721 | case AUDIT_FSUID: |
722 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: |
723 | case AUDIT_OBJ_UID: |
724 | if (!uid_eq(a->fields[i].uid, b->fields[i].uid)) |
725 | return 1; |
726 | break; |
727 | case AUDIT_GID: |
728 | case AUDIT_EGID: |
729 | case AUDIT_SGID: |
730 | case AUDIT_FSGID: |
731 | case AUDIT_OBJ_GID: |
732 | if (!gid_eq(a->fields[i].gid, b->fields[i].gid)) |
733 | return 1; |
734 | break; |
735 | default: |
736 | if (a->fields[i].val != b->fields[i].val) |
737 | return 1; |
738 | } |
739 | } |
740 | |
741 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) |
742 | if (a->mask[i] != b->mask[i]) |
743 | return 1; |
744 | |
745 | return 0; |
746 | } |
747 | |
748 | /* Duplicate LSM field information. The lsm_rule is opaque, so must be |
749 | * re-initialized. */ |
750 | static inline int audit_dupe_lsm_field(struct audit_field *df, |
751 | struct audit_field *sf) |
752 | { |
753 | int ret = 0; |
754 | char *lsm_str; |
755 | |
756 | /* our own copy of lsm_str */ |
757 | lsm_str = kstrdup(sf->lsm_str, GFP_KERNEL); |
758 | if (unlikely(!lsm_str)) |
759 | return -ENOMEM; |
760 | df->lsm_str = lsm_str; |
761 | |
762 | /* our own (refreshed) copy of lsm_rule */ |
763 | ret = security_audit_rule_init(df->type, df->op, df->lsm_str, |
764 | (void **)&df->lsm_rule); |
765 | /* Keep currently invalid fields around in case they |
766 | * become valid after a policy reload. */ |
767 | if (ret == -EINVAL) { |
768 | pr_warn("audit rule for LSM \'%s\' is invalid\n", |
769 | df->lsm_str); |
770 | ret = 0; |
771 | } |
772 | |
773 | return ret; |
774 | } |
775 | |
776 | /* Duplicate an audit rule. This will be a deep copy with the exception |
777 | * of the watch - that pointer is carried over. The LSM specific fields |
778 | * will be updated in the copy. The point is to be able to replace the old |
779 | * rule with the new rule in the filterlist, then free the old rule. |
780 | * The rlist element is undefined; list manipulations are handled apart from |
781 | * the initial copy. */ |
782 | struct audit_entry *audit_dupe_rule(struct audit_krule *old) |
783 | { |
784 | u32 fcount = old->field_count; |
785 | struct audit_entry *entry; |
786 | struct audit_krule *new; |
787 | char *fk; |
788 | int i, err = 0; |
789 | |
790 | entry = audit_init_entry(fcount); |
791 | if (unlikely(!entry)) |
792 | return ERR_PTR(-ENOMEM); |
793 | |
794 | new = &entry->rule; |
795 | new->flags = old->flags; |
796 | new->pflags = old->pflags; |
797 | new->listnr = old->listnr; |
798 | new->action = old->action; |
799 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_BITMASK_SIZE; i++) |
800 | new->mask[i] = old->mask[i]; |
801 | new->prio = old->prio; |
802 | new->buflen = old->buflen; |
803 | new->inode_f = old->inode_f; |
804 | new->field_count = old->field_count; |
805 | |
806 | /* |
807 | * note that we are OK with not refcounting here; audit_match_tree() |
808 | * never dereferences tree and we can't get false positives there |
809 | * since we'd have to have rule gone from the list *and* removed |
810 | * before the chunks found by lookup had been allocated, i.e. before |
811 | * the beginning of list scan. |
812 | */ |
813 | new->tree = old->tree; |
814 | memcpy(new->fields, old->fields, sizeof(struct audit_field) * fcount); |
815 | |
816 | /* deep copy this information, updating the lsm_rule fields, because |
817 | * the originals will all be freed when the old rule is freed. */ |
818 | for (i = 0; i < fcount; i++) { |
819 | switch (new->fields[i].type) { |
820 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: |
821 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: |
822 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: |
823 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: |
824 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: |
825 | case AUDIT_OBJ_USER: |
826 | case AUDIT_OBJ_ROLE: |
827 | case AUDIT_OBJ_TYPE: |
828 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_LOW: |
829 | case AUDIT_OBJ_LEV_HIGH: |
830 | err = audit_dupe_lsm_field(&new->fields[i], |
831 | &old->fields[i]); |
832 | break; |
833 | case AUDIT_FILTERKEY: |
834 | fk = kstrdup(old->filterkey, GFP_KERNEL); |
835 | if (unlikely(!fk)) |
836 | err = -ENOMEM; |
837 | else |
838 | new->filterkey = fk; |
839 | break; |
840 | case AUDIT_EXE: |
841 | err = audit_dupe_exe(new, old); |
842 | break; |
843 | } |
844 | if (err) { |
845 | if (new->exe) |
846 | audit_remove_mark(new->exe); |
847 | audit_free_rule(entry); |
848 | return ERR_PTR(err); |
849 | } |
850 | } |
851 | |
852 | if (old->watch) { |
853 | audit_get_watch(old->watch); |
854 | new->watch = old->watch; |
855 | } |
856 | |
857 | return entry; |
858 | } |
859 | |
860 | /* Find an existing audit rule. |
861 | * Caller must hold audit_filter_mutex to prevent stale rule data. */ |
862 | static struct audit_entry *audit_find_rule(struct audit_entry *entry, |
863 | struct list_head **p) |
864 | { |
865 | struct audit_entry *e, *found = NULL; |
866 | struct list_head *list; |
867 | int h; |
868 | |
869 | if (entry->rule.inode_f) { |
870 | h = audit_hash_ino(entry->rule.inode_f->val); |
871 | *p = list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; |
872 | } else if (entry->rule.watch) { |
873 | /* we don't know the inode number, so must walk entire hash */ |
874 | for (h = 0; h < AUDIT_INODE_BUCKETS; h++) { |
875 | list = &audit_inode_hash[h]; |
876 | list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) |
877 | if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) { |
878 | found = e; |
879 | goto out; |
880 | } |
881 | } |
882 | goto out; |
883 | } else { |
884 | *p = list = &audit_filter_list[entry->rule.listnr]; |
885 | } |
886 | |
887 | list_for_each_entry(e, list, list) |
888 | if (!audit_compare_rule(&entry->rule, &e->rule)) { |
889 | found = e; |
890 | goto out; |
891 | } |
892 | |
893 | out: |
894 | return found; |
895 | } |
896 | |
897 | static u64 prio_low = ~0ULL/2; |
898 | static u64 prio_high = ~0ULL/2 - 1; |
899 | |
900 | /* Add rule to given filterlist if not a duplicate. */ |
901 | static inline int audit_add_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) |
902 | { |
903 | struct audit_entry *e; |
904 | struct audit_watch *watch = entry->rule.watch; |
905 | struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree; |
906 | struct list_head *list; |
907 | int err = 0; |
908 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL |
909 | int dont_count = 0; |
910 | |
911 | /* If either of these, don't count towards total */ |
912 | if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_USER || |
913 | entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE) |
914 | dont_count = 1; |
915 | #endif |
916 | |
917 | mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); |
918 | e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list); |
919 | if (e) { |
920 | mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); |
921 | err = -EEXIST; |
922 | /* normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it on failure */ |
923 | if (tree) |
924 | audit_put_tree(tree); |
925 | return err; |
926 | } |
927 | |
928 | if (watch) { |
929 | /* audit_filter_mutex is dropped and re-taken during this call */ |
930 | err = audit_add_watch(&entry->rule, &list); |
931 | if (err) { |
932 | mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); |
933 | /* |
934 | * normally audit_add_tree_rule() will free it |
935 | * on failure |
936 | */ |
937 | if (tree) |
938 | audit_put_tree(tree); |
939 | return err; |
940 | } |
941 | } |
942 | if (tree) { |
943 | err = audit_add_tree_rule(&entry->rule); |
944 | if (err) { |
945 | mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); |
946 | return err; |
947 | } |
948 | } |
949 | |
950 | entry->rule.prio = ~0ULL; |
951 | if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_EXIT) { |
952 | if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) |
953 | entry->rule.prio = ++prio_high; |
954 | else |
955 | entry->rule.prio = --prio_low; |
956 | } |
957 | |
958 | if (entry->rule.flags & AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND) { |
959 | list_add(&entry->rule.list, |
960 | &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]); |
961 | list_add_rcu(&entry->list, list); |
962 | entry->rule.flags &= ~AUDIT_FILTER_PREPEND; |
963 | } else { |
964 | list_add_tail(&entry->rule.list, |
965 | &audit_rules_list[entry->rule.listnr]); |
966 | list_add_tail_rcu(&entry->list, list); |
967 | } |
968 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL |
969 | if (!dont_count) |
970 | audit_n_rules++; |
971 | |
972 | if (!audit_match_signal(entry)) |
973 | audit_signals++; |
974 | #endif |
975 | mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); |
976 | |
977 | return err; |
978 | } |
979 | |
980 | /* Remove an existing rule from filterlist. */ |
981 | int audit_del_rule(struct audit_entry *entry) |
982 | { |
983 | struct audit_entry *e; |
984 | struct audit_tree *tree = entry->rule.tree; |
985 | struct list_head *list; |
986 | int ret = 0; |
987 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL |
988 | int dont_count = 0; |
989 | |
990 | /* If either of these, don't count towards total */ |
991 | if (entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_USER || |
992 | entry->rule.listnr == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE) |
993 | dont_count = 1; |
994 | #endif |
995 | |
996 | mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); |
997 | e = audit_find_rule(entry, &list); |
998 | if (!e) { |
999 | ret = -ENOENT; |
1000 | goto out; |
1001 | } |
1002 | |
1003 | if (e->rule.watch) |
1004 | audit_remove_watch_rule(&e->rule); |
1005 | |
1006 | if (e->rule.tree) |
1007 | audit_remove_tree_rule(&e->rule); |
1008 | |
1009 | if (e->rule.exe) |
1010 | audit_remove_mark_rule(&e->rule); |
1011 | |
1012 | #ifdef CONFIG_AUDITSYSCALL |
1013 | if (!dont_count) |
1014 | audit_n_rules--; |
1015 | |
1016 | if (!audit_match_signal(entry)) |
1017 | audit_signals--; |
1018 | #endif |
1019 | |
1020 | list_del_rcu(&e->list); |
1021 | list_del(&e->rule.list); |
1022 | call_rcu(&e->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu); |
1023 | |
1024 | out: |
1025 | mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); |
1026 | |
1027 | if (tree) |
1028 | audit_put_tree(tree); /* that's the temporary one */ |
1029 | |
1030 | return ret; |
1031 | } |
1032 | |
1033 | /* List rules using struct audit_rule_data. */ |
1034 | static void audit_list_rules(__u32 portid, int seq, struct sk_buff_head *q) |
1035 | { |
1036 | struct sk_buff *skb; |
1037 | struct audit_krule *r; |
1038 | int i; |
1039 | |
1040 | /* This is a blocking read, so use audit_filter_mutex instead of rcu |
1041 | * iterator to sync with list writers. */ |
1042 | for (i=0; i<AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) { |
1043 | list_for_each_entry(r, &audit_rules_list[i], list) { |
1044 | struct audit_rule_data *data; |
1045 | |
1046 | data = audit_krule_to_data(r); |
1047 | if (unlikely(!data)) |
1048 | break; |
1049 | skb = audit_make_reply(portid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, |
1050 | 0, 1, data, |
1051 | sizeof(*data) + data->buflen); |
1052 | if (skb) |
1053 | skb_queue_tail(q, skb); |
1054 | kfree(data); |
1055 | } |
1056 | } |
1057 | skb = audit_make_reply(portid, seq, AUDIT_LIST_RULES, 1, 1, NULL, 0); |
1058 | if (skb) |
1059 | skb_queue_tail(q, skb); |
1060 | } |
1061 | |
1062 | /* Log rule additions and removals */ |
1063 | static void audit_log_rule_change(char *action, struct audit_krule *rule, int res) |
1064 | { |
1065 | struct audit_buffer *ab; |
1066 | uid_t loginuid = from_kuid(&init_user_ns, audit_get_loginuid(current)); |
1067 | unsigned int sessionid = audit_get_sessionid(current); |
1068 | |
1069 | if (!audit_enabled) |
1070 | return; |
1071 | |
1072 | ab = audit_log_start(NULL, GFP_KERNEL, AUDIT_CONFIG_CHANGE); |
1073 | if (!ab) |
1074 | return; |
1075 | audit_log_format(ab, "auid=%u ses=%u" ,loginuid, sessionid); |
1076 | audit_log_task_context(ab); |
1077 | audit_log_format(ab, " op="); |
1078 | audit_log_string(ab, action); |
1079 | audit_log_key(ab, rule->filterkey); |
1080 | audit_log_format(ab, " list=%d res=%d", rule->listnr, res); |
1081 | audit_log_end(ab); |
1082 | } |
1083 | |
1084 | /** |
1085 | * audit_rule_change - apply all rules to the specified message type |
1086 | * @type: audit message type |
1087 | * @portid: target port id for netlink audit messages |
1088 | * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number |
1089 | * @data: payload data |
1090 | * @datasz: size of payload data |
1091 | */ |
1092 | int audit_rule_change(int type, __u32 portid, int seq, void *data, |
1093 | size_t datasz) |
1094 | { |
1095 | int err = 0; |
1096 | struct audit_entry *entry; |
1097 | |
1098 | switch (type) { |
1099 | case AUDIT_ADD_RULE: |
1100 | entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz); |
1101 | if (IS_ERR(entry)) |
1102 | return PTR_ERR(entry); |
1103 | err = audit_add_rule(entry); |
1104 | audit_log_rule_change("add_rule", &entry->rule, !err); |
1105 | break; |
1106 | case AUDIT_DEL_RULE: |
1107 | entry = audit_data_to_entry(data, datasz); |
1108 | if (IS_ERR(entry)) |
1109 | return PTR_ERR(entry); |
1110 | err = audit_del_rule(entry); |
1111 | audit_log_rule_change("remove_rule", &entry->rule, !err); |
1112 | break; |
1113 | default: |
1114 | WARN_ON(1); |
1115 | return -EINVAL; |
1116 | } |
1117 | |
1118 | if (err || type == AUDIT_DEL_RULE) { |
1119 | if (entry->rule.exe) |
1120 | audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); |
1121 | audit_free_rule(entry); |
1122 | } |
1123 | |
1124 | return err; |
1125 | } |
1126 | |
1127 | /** |
1128 | * audit_list_rules_send - list the audit rules |
1129 | * @request_skb: skb of request we are replying to (used to target the reply) |
1130 | * @seq: netlink audit message sequence (serial) number |
1131 | */ |
1132 | int audit_list_rules_send(struct sk_buff *request_skb, int seq) |
1133 | { |
1134 | u32 portid = NETLINK_CB(request_skb).portid; |
1135 | struct net *net = sock_net(NETLINK_CB(request_skb).sk); |
1136 | struct task_struct *tsk; |
1137 | struct audit_netlink_list *dest; |
1138 | int err = 0; |
1139 | |
1140 | /* We can't just spew out the rules here because we might fill |
1141 | * the available socket buffer space and deadlock waiting for |
1142 | * auditctl to read from it... which isn't ever going to |
1143 | * happen if we're actually running in the context of auditctl |
1144 | * trying to _send_ the stuff */ |
1145 | |
1146 | dest = kmalloc(sizeof(struct audit_netlink_list), GFP_KERNEL); |
1147 | if (!dest) |
1148 | return -ENOMEM; |
1149 | dest->net = get_net(net); |
1150 | dest->portid = portid; |
1151 | skb_queue_head_init(&dest->q); |
1152 | |
1153 | mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); |
1154 | audit_list_rules(portid, seq, &dest->q); |
1155 | mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); |
1156 | |
1157 | tsk = kthread_run(audit_send_list, dest, "audit_send_list"); |
1158 | if (IS_ERR(tsk)) { |
1159 | skb_queue_purge(&dest->q); |
1160 | kfree(dest); |
1161 | err = PTR_ERR(tsk); |
1162 | } |
1163 | |
1164 | return err; |
1165 | } |
1166 | |
1167 | int audit_comparator(u32 left, u32 op, u32 right) |
1168 | { |
1169 | switch (op) { |
1170 | case Audit_equal: |
1171 | return (left == right); |
1172 | case Audit_not_equal: |
1173 | return (left != right); |
1174 | case Audit_lt: |
1175 | return (left < right); |
1176 | case Audit_le: |
1177 | return (left <= right); |
1178 | case Audit_gt: |
1179 | return (left > right); |
1180 | case Audit_ge: |
1181 | return (left >= right); |
1182 | case Audit_bitmask: |
1183 | return (left & right); |
1184 | case Audit_bittest: |
1185 | return ((left & right) == right); |
1186 | default: |
1187 | BUG(); |
1188 | return 0; |
1189 | } |
1190 | } |
1191 | |
1192 | int audit_uid_comparator(kuid_t left, u32 op, kuid_t right) |
1193 | { |
1194 | switch (op) { |
1195 | case Audit_equal: |
1196 | return uid_eq(left, right); |
1197 | case Audit_not_equal: |
1198 | return !uid_eq(left, right); |
1199 | case Audit_lt: |
1200 | return uid_lt(left, right); |
1201 | case Audit_le: |
1202 | return uid_lte(left, right); |
1203 | case Audit_gt: |
1204 | return uid_gt(left, right); |
1205 | case Audit_ge: |
1206 | return uid_gte(left, right); |
1207 | case Audit_bitmask: |
1208 | case Audit_bittest: |
1209 | default: |
1210 | BUG(); |
1211 | return 0; |
1212 | } |
1213 | } |
1214 | |
1215 | int audit_gid_comparator(kgid_t left, u32 op, kgid_t right) |
1216 | { |
1217 | switch (op) { |
1218 | case Audit_equal: |
1219 | return gid_eq(left, right); |
1220 | case Audit_not_equal: |
1221 | return !gid_eq(left, right); |
1222 | case Audit_lt: |
1223 | return gid_lt(left, right); |
1224 | case Audit_le: |
1225 | return gid_lte(left, right); |
1226 | case Audit_gt: |
1227 | return gid_gt(left, right); |
1228 | case Audit_ge: |
1229 | return gid_gte(left, right); |
1230 | case Audit_bitmask: |
1231 | case Audit_bittest: |
1232 | default: |
1233 | BUG(); |
1234 | return 0; |
1235 | } |
1236 | } |
1237 | |
1238 | /** |
1239 | * parent_len - find the length of the parent portion of a pathname |
1240 | * @path: pathname of which to determine length |
1241 | */ |
1242 | int parent_len(const char *path) |
1243 | { |
1244 | int plen; |
1245 | const char *p; |
1246 | |
1247 | plen = strlen(path); |
1248 | |
1249 | if (plen == 0) |
1250 | return plen; |
1251 | |
1252 | /* disregard trailing slashes */ |
1253 | p = path + plen - 1; |
1254 | while ((*p == '/') && (p > path)) |
1255 | p--; |
1256 | |
1257 | /* walk backward until we find the next slash or hit beginning */ |
1258 | while ((*p != '/') && (p > path)) |
1259 | p--; |
1260 | |
1261 | /* did we find a slash? Then increment to include it in path */ |
1262 | if (*p == '/') |
1263 | p++; |
1264 | |
1265 | return p - path; |
1266 | } |
1267 | |
1268 | /** |
1269 | * audit_compare_dname_path - compare given dentry name with last component in |
1270 | * given path. Return of 0 indicates a match. |
1271 | * @dname: dentry name that we're comparing |
1272 | * @path: full pathname that we're comparing |
1273 | * @parentlen: length of the parent if known. Passing in AUDIT_NAME_FULL |
1274 | * here indicates that we must compute this value. |
1275 | */ |
1276 | int audit_compare_dname_path(const char *dname, const char *path, int parentlen) |
1277 | { |
1278 | int dlen, pathlen; |
1279 | const char *p; |
1280 | |
1281 | dlen = strlen(dname); |
1282 | pathlen = strlen(path); |
1283 | if (pathlen < dlen) |
1284 | return 1; |
1285 | |
1286 | parentlen = parentlen == AUDIT_NAME_FULL ? parent_len(path) : parentlen; |
1287 | if (pathlen - parentlen != dlen) |
1288 | return 1; |
1289 | |
1290 | p = path + parentlen; |
1291 | |
1292 | return strncmp(p, dname, dlen); |
1293 | } |
1294 | |
1295 | int audit_filter(int msgtype, unsigned int listtype) |
1296 | { |
1297 | struct audit_entry *e; |
1298 | int ret = 1; /* Audit by default */ |
1299 | |
1300 | rcu_read_lock(); |
1301 | if (list_empty(&audit_filter_list[listtype])) |
1302 | goto unlock_and_return; |
1303 | list_for_each_entry_rcu(e, &audit_filter_list[listtype], list) { |
1304 | int i, result = 0; |
1305 | |
1306 | for (i = 0; i < e->rule.field_count; i++) { |
1307 | struct audit_field *f = &e->rule.fields[i]; |
1308 | pid_t pid; |
1309 | u32 sid; |
1310 | |
1311 | switch (f->type) { |
1312 | case AUDIT_PID: |
1313 | pid = task_pid_nr(current); |
1314 | result = audit_comparator(pid, f->op, f->val); |
1315 | break; |
1316 | case AUDIT_UID: |
1317 | result = audit_uid_comparator(current_uid(), f->op, f->uid); |
1318 | break; |
1319 | case AUDIT_GID: |
1320 | result = audit_gid_comparator(current_gid(), f->op, f->gid); |
1321 | break; |
1322 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID: |
1323 | result = audit_uid_comparator(audit_get_loginuid(current), |
1324 | f->op, f->uid); |
1325 | break; |
1326 | case AUDIT_LOGINUID_SET: |
1327 | result = audit_comparator(audit_loginuid_set(current), |
1328 | f->op, f->val); |
1329 | break; |
1330 | case AUDIT_MSGTYPE: |
1331 | result = audit_comparator(msgtype, f->op, f->val); |
1332 | break; |
1333 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_USER: |
1334 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_ROLE: |
1335 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_TYPE: |
1336 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_SEN: |
1337 | case AUDIT_SUBJ_CLR: |
1338 | if (f->lsm_rule) { |
1339 | security_task_getsecid(current, &sid); |
1340 | result = security_audit_rule_match(sid, |
1341 | f->type, f->op, f->lsm_rule, NULL); |
1342 | } |
1343 | break; |
1344 | default: |
1345 | goto unlock_and_return; |
1346 | } |
1347 | if (result < 0) /* error */ |
1348 | goto unlock_and_return; |
1349 | if (!result) |
1350 | break; |
1351 | } |
1352 | if (result > 0) { |
1353 | if (e->rule.action == AUDIT_NEVER || listtype == AUDIT_FILTER_TYPE) |
1354 | ret = 0; |
1355 | break; |
1356 | } |
1357 | } |
1358 | unlock_and_return: |
1359 | rcu_read_unlock(); |
1360 | return ret; |
1361 | } |
1362 | |
1363 | static int update_lsm_rule(struct audit_krule *r) |
1364 | { |
1365 | struct audit_entry *entry = container_of(r, struct audit_entry, rule); |
1366 | struct audit_entry *nentry; |
1367 | int err = 0; |
1368 | |
1369 | if (!security_audit_rule_known(r)) |
1370 | return 0; |
1371 | |
1372 | nentry = audit_dupe_rule(r); |
1373 | if (entry->rule.exe) |
1374 | audit_remove_mark(entry->rule.exe); |
1375 | if (IS_ERR(nentry)) { |
1376 | /* save the first error encountered for the |
1377 | * return value */ |
1378 | err = PTR_ERR(nentry); |
1379 | audit_panic("error updating LSM filters"); |
1380 | if (r->watch) |
1381 | list_del(&r->rlist); |
1382 | list_del_rcu(&entry->list); |
1383 | list_del(&r->list); |
1384 | } else { |
1385 | if (r->watch || r->tree) |
1386 | list_replace_init(&r->rlist, &nentry->rule.rlist); |
1387 | list_replace_rcu(&entry->list, &nentry->list); |
1388 | list_replace(&r->list, &nentry->rule.list); |
1389 | } |
1390 | call_rcu(&entry->rcu, audit_free_rule_rcu); |
1391 | |
1392 | return err; |
1393 | } |
1394 | |
1395 | /* This function will re-initialize the lsm_rule field of all applicable rules. |
1396 | * It will traverse the filter lists serarching for rules that contain LSM |
1397 | * specific filter fields. When such a rule is found, it is copied, the |
1398 | * LSM field is re-initialized, and the old rule is replaced with the |
1399 | * updated rule. */ |
1400 | int audit_update_lsm_rules(void) |
1401 | { |
1402 | struct audit_krule *r, *n; |
1403 | int i, err = 0; |
1404 | |
1405 | /* audit_filter_mutex synchronizes the writers */ |
1406 | mutex_lock(&audit_filter_mutex); |
1407 | |
1408 | for (i = 0; i < AUDIT_NR_FILTERS; i++) { |
1409 | list_for_each_entry_safe(r, n, &audit_rules_list[i], list) { |
1410 | int res = update_lsm_rule(r); |
1411 | if (!err) |
1412 | err = res; |
1413 | } |
1414 | } |
1415 | mutex_unlock(&audit_filter_mutex); |
1416 | |
1417 | return err; |
1418 | } |
1419 |