blob: 80a2934d3110881cfc11fd4fd74336f9a2104a50
1 | # |
2 | # Security configuration |
3 | # |
4 | |
5 | menu "Security options" |
6 | |
7 | source security/keys/Kconfig |
8 | |
9 | config SECURITY_DMESG_RESTRICT |
10 | bool "Restrict unprivileged access to the kernel syslog" |
11 | default n |
12 | help |
13 | This enforces restrictions on unprivileged users reading the kernel |
14 | syslog via dmesg(8). |
15 | |
16 | If this option is not selected, no restrictions will be enforced |
17 | unless the dmesg_restrict sysctl is explicitly set to (1). |
18 | |
19 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
20 | |
21 | config SECURITY_PERF_EVENTS_RESTRICT |
22 | bool "Restrict unprivileged use of performance events" |
23 | depends on PERF_EVENTS |
24 | help |
25 | If you say Y here, the kernel.perf_event_paranoid sysctl |
26 | will be set to 3 by default, and no unprivileged use of the |
27 | perf_event_open syscall will be permitted unless it is |
28 | changed. |
29 | |
30 | config SECURITY |
31 | bool "Enable different security models" |
32 | depends on SYSFS |
33 | depends on MULTIUSER |
34 | help |
35 | This allows you to choose different security modules to be |
36 | configured into your kernel. |
37 | |
38 | If this option is not selected, the default Linux security |
39 | model will be used. |
40 | |
41 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
42 | |
43 | config PAGE_TABLE_ISOLATION |
44 | bool "Remove the kernel mapping in user mode" |
45 | default y |
46 | depends on X86_64 && SMP |
47 | help |
48 | This enforces a strict kernel and user space isolation, in order |
49 | to close hardware side channels on kernel address information. |
50 | |
51 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer Y. |
52 | |
53 | config SECURITYFS |
54 | bool "Enable the securityfs filesystem" |
55 | help |
56 | This will build the securityfs filesystem. It is currently used by |
57 | the TPM bios character driver and IMA, an integrity provider. It is |
58 | not used by SELinux or SMACK. |
59 | |
60 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
61 | |
62 | config SECURITY_NETWORK |
63 | bool "Socket and Networking Security Hooks" |
64 | depends on SECURITY |
65 | help |
66 | This enables the socket and networking security hooks. |
67 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to |
68 | implement socket and networking access controls. |
69 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
70 | |
71 | config SECURITY_NETWORK_XFRM |
72 | bool "XFRM (IPSec) Networking Security Hooks" |
73 | depends on XFRM && SECURITY_NETWORK |
74 | help |
75 | This enables the XFRM (IPSec) networking security hooks. |
76 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to |
77 | implement per-packet access controls based on labels |
78 | derived from IPSec policy. Non-IPSec communications are |
79 | designated as unlabelled, and only sockets authorized |
80 | to communicate unlabelled data can send without using |
81 | IPSec. |
82 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
83 | |
84 | config SECURITY_PATH |
85 | bool "Security hooks for pathname based access control" |
86 | depends on SECURITY |
87 | help |
88 | This enables the security hooks for pathname based access control. |
89 | If enabled, a security module can use these hooks to |
90 | implement pathname based access controls. |
91 | If you are unsure how to answer this question, answer N. |
92 | |
93 | config INTEL_TXT |
94 | bool "Enable Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology (Intel(R) TXT)" |
95 | depends on HAVE_INTEL_TXT |
96 | help |
97 | This option enables support for booting the kernel with the |
98 | Trusted Boot (tboot) module. This will utilize |
99 | Intel(R) Trusted Execution Technology to perform a measured launch |
100 | of the kernel. If the system does not support Intel(R) TXT, this |
101 | will have no effect. |
102 | |
103 | Intel TXT will provide higher assurance of system configuration and |
104 | initial state as well as data reset protection. This is used to |
105 | create a robust initial kernel measurement and verification, which |
106 | helps to ensure that kernel security mechanisms are functioning |
107 | correctly. This level of protection requires a root of trust outside |
108 | of the kernel itself. |
109 | |
110 | Intel TXT also helps solve real end user concerns about having |
111 | confidence that their hardware is running the VMM or kernel that |
112 | it was configured with, especially since they may be responsible for |
113 | providing such assurances to VMs and services running on it. |
114 | |
115 | See <http://www.intel.com/technology/security/> for more information |
116 | about Intel(R) TXT. |
117 | See <http://tboot.sourceforge.net> for more information about tboot. |
118 | See Documentation/intel_txt.txt for a description of how to enable |
119 | Intel TXT support in a kernel boot. |
120 | |
121 | If you are unsure as to whether this is required, answer N. |
122 | |
123 | config LSM_MMAP_MIN_ADDR |
124 | int "Low address space for LSM to protect from user allocation" |
125 | depends on SECURITY && SECURITY_SELINUX |
126 | default 32768 if ARM || (ARM64 && COMPAT) |
127 | default 65536 |
128 | help |
129 | This is the portion of low virtual memory which should be protected |
130 | from userspace allocation. Keeping a user from writing to low pages |
131 | can help reduce the impact of kernel NULL pointer bugs. |
132 | |
133 | For most ia64, ppc64 and x86 users with lots of address space |
134 | a value of 65536 is reasonable and should cause no problems. |
135 | On arm and other archs it should not be higher than 32768. |
136 | Programs which use vm86 functionality or have some need to map |
137 | this low address space will need the permission specific to the |
138 | systems running LSM. |
139 | |
140 | config HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR |
141 | bool |
142 | help |
143 | The heap allocator implements __check_heap_object() for |
144 | validating memory ranges against heap object sizes in |
145 | support of CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY. |
146 | |
147 | config HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY |
148 | bool |
149 | help |
150 | The architecture supports CONFIG_HARDENED_USERCOPY by |
151 | calling check_object_size() just before performing the |
152 | userspace copies in the low level implementation of |
153 | copy_to_user() and copy_from_user(). |
154 | |
155 | config HARDENED_USERCOPY |
156 | bool "Harden memory copies between kernel and userspace" |
157 | depends on HAVE_ARCH_HARDENED_USERCOPY |
158 | depends on HAVE_HARDENED_USERCOPY_ALLOCATOR |
159 | select BUG |
160 | help |
161 | This option checks for obviously wrong memory regions when |
162 | copying memory to/from the kernel (via copy_to_user() and |
163 | copy_from_user() functions) by rejecting memory ranges that |
164 | are larger than the specified heap object, span multiple |
165 | separately allocates pages, are not on the process stack, |
166 | or are part of the kernel text. This kills entire classes |
167 | of heap overflow exploits and similar kernel memory exposures. |
168 | |
169 | config HARDENED_USERCOPY_PAGESPAN |
170 | bool "Refuse to copy allocations that span multiple pages" |
171 | depends on HARDENED_USERCOPY |
172 | depends on EXPERT |
173 | help |
174 | When a multi-page allocation is done without __GFP_COMP, |
175 | hardened usercopy will reject attempts to copy it. There are, |
176 | however, several cases of this in the kernel that have not all |
177 | been removed. This config is intended to be used only while |
178 | trying to find such users. |
179 | |
180 | source security/selinux/Kconfig |
181 | source security/smack/Kconfig |
182 | source security/tomoyo/Kconfig |
183 | source security/apparmor/Kconfig |
184 | source security/loadpin/Kconfig |
185 | source security/yama/Kconfig |
186 | |
187 | source security/integrity/Kconfig |
188 | |
189 | choice |
190 | prompt "Default security module" |
191 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX if SECURITY_SELINUX |
192 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK if SECURITY_SMACK |
193 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO if SECURITY_TOMOYO |
194 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR if SECURITY_APPARMOR |
195 | default DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
196 | |
197 | help |
198 | Select the security module that will be used by default if the |
199 | kernel parameter security= is not specified. |
200 | |
201 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX |
202 | bool "SELinux" if SECURITY_SELINUX=y |
203 | |
204 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK |
205 | bool "Simplified Mandatory Access Control" if SECURITY_SMACK=y |
206 | |
207 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO |
208 | bool "TOMOYO" if SECURITY_TOMOYO=y |
209 | |
210 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR |
211 | bool "AppArmor" if SECURITY_APPARMOR=y |
212 | |
213 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
214 | bool "Unix Discretionary Access Controls" |
215 | |
216 | endchoice |
217 | |
218 | config DEFAULT_SECURITY |
219 | string |
220 | default "selinux" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SELINUX |
221 | default "smack" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_SMACK |
222 | default "tomoyo" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_TOMOYO |
223 | default "apparmor" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_APPARMOR |
224 | default "" if DEFAULT_SECURITY_DAC |
225 | |
226 | endmenu |
227 | |
228 |