blob: 862104c9fac8dad703eec9b3a93a7019f7e2f7ad
1 | /* vi: set sw=4 ts=4: */ |
2 | /* |
3 | * Licensed under GPLv2 or later, see file LICENSE in this source tree. |
4 | */ |
5 | |
6 | //usage:#define login_trivial_usage |
7 | //usage: "[-p] [-h HOST] [[-f] USER]" |
8 | //usage:#define login_full_usage "\n\n" |
9 | //usage: "Begin a new session on the system\n" |
10 | //usage: "\n -f Don't authenticate (user already authenticated)" |
11 | //usage: "\n -h Name of the remote host" |
12 | //usage: "\n -p Preserve environment" |
13 | |
14 | #include "libbb.h" |
15 | #include <syslog.h> |
16 | #include <sys/resource.h> |
17 | |
18 | #if ENABLE_SELINUX |
19 | # include <selinux/selinux.h> /* for is_selinux_enabled() */ |
20 | #ifndef __BIONIC__ |
21 | # include <selinux/get_context_list.h> /* for get_default_context() */ |
22 | # include <selinux/flask.h> /* for security class definitions */ |
23 | #endif |
24 | #endif |
25 | |
26 | #if ENABLE_PAM |
27 | /* PAM may include <locale.h>. We may need to undefine bbox's stub define: */ |
28 | # undef setlocale |
29 | /* For some obscure reason, PAM is not in pam/xxx, but in security/xxx. |
30 | * Apparently they like to confuse people. */ |
31 | # include <security/pam_appl.h> |
32 | # include <security/pam_misc.h> |
33 | static const struct pam_conv conv = { |
34 | misc_conv, |
35 | NULL |
36 | }; |
37 | #endif |
38 | |
39 | enum { |
40 | TIMEOUT = 60, |
41 | EMPTY_USERNAME_COUNT = 10, |
42 | /* Some users found 32 chars limit to be too low: */ |
43 | USERNAME_SIZE = 64, |
44 | TTYNAME_SIZE = 32, |
45 | }; |
46 | |
47 | struct globals { |
48 | struct termios tty_attrs; |
49 | } FIX_ALIASING; |
50 | #define G (*(struct globals*)&bb_common_bufsiz1) |
51 | #define INIT_G() do { } while (0) |
52 | |
53 | |
54 | #if ENABLE_FEATURE_NOLOGIN |
55 | static void die_if_nologin(void) |
56 | { |
57 | FILE *fp; |
58 | int c; |
59 | int empty = 1; |
60 | |
61 | fp = fopen_for_read("/etc/nologin"); |
62 | if (!fp) /* assuming it does not exist */ |
63 | return; |
64 | |
65 | while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF) { |
66 | if (c == '\n') |
67 | bb_putchar('\r'); |
68 | bb_putchar(c); |
69 | empty = 0; |
70 | } |
71 | if (empty) |
72 | puts("\r\nSystem closed for routine maintenance\r"); |
73 | |
74 | fclose(fp); |
75 | fflush_all(); |
76 | /* Users say that they do need this prior to exit: */ |
77 | tcdrain(STDOUT_FILENO); |
78 | exit(EXIT_FAILURE); |
79 | } |
80 | #else |
81 | # define die_if_nologin() ((void)0) |
82 | #endif |
83 | |
84 | #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SECURETTY && !ENABLE_PAM |
85 | static int check_securetty(const char *short_tty) |
86 | { |
87 | char *buf = (char*)"/etc/securetty"; /* any non-NULL is ok */ |
88 | parser_t *parser = config_open2("/etc/securetty", fopen_for_read); |
89 | while (config_read(parser, &buf, 1, 1, "# \t", PARSE_NORMAL)) { |
90 | if (strcmp(buf, short_tty) == 0) |
91 | break; |
92 | buf = NULL; |
93 | } |
94 | config_close(parser); |
95 | /* buf != NULL here if config file was not found, empty |
96 | * or line was found which equals short_tty */ |
97 | return buf != NULL; |
98 | } |
99 | #else |
100 | static ALWAYS_INLINE int check_securetty(const char *short_tty UNUSED_PARAM) { return 1; } |
101 | #endif |
102 | |
103 | #if ENABLE_SELINUX |
104 | static void initselinux(char *username, char *full_tty, |
105 | security_context_t *user_sid) |
106 | { |
107 | security_context_t old_tty_sid, new_tty_sid; |
108 | |
109 | if (!is_selinux_enabled()) |
110 | return; |
111 | |
112 | if (get_default_context(username, NULL, user_sid)) { |
113 | bb_error_msg_and_die("can't get SID for %s", username); |
114 | } |
115 | if (getfilecon(full_tty, &old_tty_sid) < 0) { |
116 | bb_perror_msg_and_die("getfilecon(%s) failed", full_tty); |
117 | } |
118 | if (security_compute_relabel(*user_sid, old_tty_sid, |
119 | SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_sid) != 0) { |
120 | bb_perror_msg_and_die("security_change_sid(%s) failed", full_tty); |
121 | } |
122 | if (setfilecon(full_tty, new_tty_sid) != 0) { |
123 | if (strcmp(old_tty_sid, new_tty_sid)) |
124 | bb_perror_msg_and_die("chsid(%s, %s) failed", full_tty, new_tty_sid); |
125 | } |
126 | } |
127 | #endif |
128 | |
129 | #if ENABLE_LOGIN_SCRIPTS |
130 | static void run_login_script(struct passwd *pw, char *full_tty) |
131 | { |
132 | char *t_argv[2]; |
133 | |
134 | t_argv[0] = getenv("LOGIN_PRE_SUID_SCRIPT"); |
135 | if (t_argv[0]) { |
136 | t_argv[1] = NULL; |
137 | xsetenv("LOGIN_TTY", full_tty); |
138 | xsetenv("LOGIN_USER", pw->pw_name); |
139 | xsetenv("LOGIN_UID", utoa(pw->pw_uid)); |
140 | xsetenv("LOGIN_GID", utoa(pw->pw_gid)); |
141 | xsetenv("LOGIN_SHELL", pw->pw_shell); |
142 | spawn_and_wait(t_argv); /* NOMMU-friendly */ |
143 | unsetenv("LOGIN_TTY"); |
144 | unsetenv("LOGIN_USER"); |
145 | unsetenv("LOGIN_UID"); |
146 | unsetenv("LOGIN_GID"); |
147 | unsetenv("LOGIN_SHELL"); |
148 | } |
149 | } |
150 | #else |
151 | void run_login_script(struct passwd *pw, char *full_tty); |
152 | #endif |
153 | |
154 | #if ENABLE_LOGIN_SESSION_AS_CHILD && ENABLE_PAM |
155 | static void login_pam_end(pam_handle_t *pamh) |
156 | { |
157 | int pamret; |
158 | |
159 | pamret = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED); |
160 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
161 | bb_error_msg("pam_%s failed: %s (%d)", "setcred", |
162 | pam_strerror(pamh, pamret), pamret); |
163 | } |
164 | pamret = pam_close_session(pamh, 0); |
165 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
166 | bb_error_msg("pam_%s failed: %s (%d)", "close_session", |
167 | pam_strerror(pamh, pamret), pamret); |
168 | } |
169 | pamret = pam_end(pamh, pamret); |
170 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
171 | bb_error_msg("pam_%s failed: %s (%d)", "end", |
172 | pam_strerror(pamh, pamret), pamret); |
173 | } |
174 | } |
175 | #endif /* ENABLE_PAM */ |
176 | |
177 | static void get_username_or_die(char *buf, int size_buf) |
178 | { |
179 | int c, cntdown; |
180 | |
181 | cntdown = EMPTY_USERNAME_COUNT; |
182 | prompt: |
183 | print_login_prompt(); |
184 | /* skip whitespace */ |
185 | do { |
186 | c = getchar(); |
187 | if (c == EOF) |
188 | exit(EXIT_FAILURE); |
189 | if (c == '\n') { |
190 | if (!--cntdown) |
191 | exit(EXIT_FAILURE); |
192 | goto prompt; |
193 | } |
194 | } while (isspace(c)); /* maybe isblank? */ |
195 | |
196 | *buf++ = c; |
197 | if (!fgets(buf, size_buf-2, stdin)) |
198 | exit(EXIT_FAILURE); |
199 | if (!strchr(buf, '\n')) |
200 | exit(EXIT_FAILURE); |
201 | while ((unsigned char)*buf > ' ') |
202 | buf++; |
203 | *buf = '\0'; |
204 | } |
205 | |
206 | static void motd(void) |
207 | { |
208 | int fd; |
209 | |
210 | fd = open(bb_path_motd_file, O_RDONLY); |
211 | if (fd >= 0) { |
212 | fflush_all(); |
213 | bb_copyfd_eof(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); |
214 | close(fd); |
215 | } |
216 | } |
217 | |
218 | static void alarm_handler(int sig UNUSED_PARAM) |
219 | { |
220 | /* This is the escape hatch! Poor serial line users and the like |
221 | * arrive here when their connection is broken. |
222 | * We don't want to block here */ |
223 | ndelay_on(STDOUT_FILENO); |
224 | /* Test for correct attr restoring: |
225 | * run "getty 0 -" from a shell, enter bogus username, stop at |
226 | * password prompt, let it time out. Without the tcsetattr below, |
227 | * when you are back at shell prompt, echo will be still off. |
228 | */ |
229 | tcsetattr_stdin_TCSANOW(&G.tty_attrs); |
230 | printf("\r\nLogin timed out after %u seconds\r\n", TIMEOUT); |
231 | fflush_all(); |
232 | /* unix API is brain damaged regarding O_NONBLOCK, |
233 | * we should undo it, or else we can affect other processes */ |
234 | ndelay_off(STDOUT_FILENO); |
235 | _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); |
236 | } |
237 | |
238 | int login_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE; |
239 | int login_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) |
240 | { |
241 | enum { |
242 | LOGIN_OPT_f = (1<<0), |
243 | LOGIN_OPT_h = (1<<1), |
244 | LOGIN_OPT_p = (1<<2), |
245 | }; |
246 | char *fromhost; |
247 | char username[USERNAME_SIZE]; |
248 | int run_by_root; |
249 | unsigned opt; |
250 | int count = 0; |
251 | struct passwd *pw; |
252 | char *opt_host = NULL; |
253 | char *opt_user = opt_user; /* for compiler */ |
254 | char *full_tty; |
255 | char *short_tty; |
256 | IF_SELINUX(security_context_t user_sid = NULL;) |
257 | #if ENABLE_PAM |
258 | int pamret; |
259 | pam_handle_t *pamh; |
260 | const char *pamuser; |
261 | const char *failed_msg; |
262 | struct passwd pwdstruct; |
263 | char pwdbuf[256]; |
264 | char **pamenv; |
265 | #endif |
266 | #if ENABLE_LOGIN_SESSION_AS_CHILD |
267 | pid_t child_pid; |
268 | #endif |
269 | |
270 | INIT_G(); |
271 | |
272 | /* More of suid paranoia if called by non-root: */ |
273 | /* Clear dangerous stuff, set PATH */ |
274 | run_by_root = !sanitize_env_if_suid(); |
275 | |
276 | /* Mandatory paranoia for suid applet: |
277 | * ensure that fd# 0,1,2 are opened (at least to /dev/null) |
278 | * and any extra open fd's are closed. |
279 | * (The name of the function is misleading. Not daemonizing here.) */ |
280 | bb_daemonize_or_rexec(DAEMON_ONLY_SANITIZE | DAEMON_CLOSE_EXTRA_FDS, NULL); |
281 | |
282 | username[0] = '\0'; |
283 | opt = getopt32(argv, "f:h:p", &opt_user, &opt_host); |
284 | if (opt & LOGIN_OPT_f) { |
285 | if (!run_by_root) |
286 | bb_error_msg_and_die("-f is for root only"); |
287 | safe_strncpy(username, opt_user, sizeof(username)); |
288 | } |
289 | argv += optind; |
290 | if (argv[0]) /* user from command line (getty) */ |
291 | safe_strncpy(username, argv[0], sizeof(username)); |
292 | |
293 | /* Save tty attributes - and by doing it, check that it's indeed a tty */ |
294 | if (tcgetattr(STDIN_FILENO, &G.tty_attrs) < 0 |
295 | || !isatty(STDOUT_FILENO) |
296 | /*|| !isatty(STDERR_FILENO) - no, guess some people might want to redirect this */ |
297 | ) { |
298 | return EXIT_FAILURE; /* Must be a terminal */ |
299 | } |
300 | |
301 | /* We install timeout handler only _after_ we saved G.tty_attrs */ |
302 | signal(SIGALRM, alarm_handler); |
303 | alarm(TIMEOUT); |
304 | |
305 | /* Find out and memorize our tty name */ |
306 | full_tty = xmalloc_ttyname(STDIN_FILENO); |
307 | if (!full_tty) |
308 | full_tty = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); |
309 | short_tty = skip_dev_pfx(full_tty); |
310 | |
311 | if (opt_host) { |
312 | fromhost = xasprintf(" on '%s' from '%s'", short_tty, opt_host); |
313 | } else { |
314 | fromhost = xasprintf(" on '%s'", short_tty); |
315 | } |
316 | |
317 | /* Was breaking "login <username>" from shell command line: */ |
318 | /*bb_setpgrp();*/ |
319 | |
320 | openlog(applet_name, LOG_PID | LOG_CONS, LOG_AUTH); |
321 | |
322 | while (1) { |
323 | /* flush away any type-ahead (as getty does) */ |
324 | tcflush(0, TCIFLUSH); |
325 | |
326 | if (!username[0]) |
327 | get_username_or_die(username, sizeof(username)); |
328 | |
329 | #if ENABLE_PAM |
330 | pamret = pam_start("login", username, &conv, &pamh); |
331 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
332 | failed_msg = "start"; |
333 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
334 | } |
335 | /* set TTY (so things like securetty work) */ |
336 | pamret = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, short_tty); |
337 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
338 | failed_msg = "set_item(TTY)"; |
339 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
340 | } |
341 | /* set RHOST */ |
342 | if (opt_host) { |
343 | pamret = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, opt_host); |
344 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
345 | failed_msg = "set_item(RHOST)"; |
346 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
347 | } |
348 | } |
349 | if (!(opt & LOGIN_OPT_f)) { |
350 | pamret = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0); |
351 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
352 | failed_msg = "authenticate"; |
353 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
354 | /* TODO: or just "goto auth_failed" |
355 | * since user seems to enter wrong password |
356 | * (in this case pamret == 7) |
357 | */ |
358 | } |
359 | } |
360 | /* check that the account is healthy */ |
361 | pamret = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0); |
362 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
363 | failed_msg = "acct_mgmt"; |
364 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
365 | } |
366 | /* read user back */ |
367 | pamuser = NULL; |
368 | /* gcc: "dereferencing type-punned pointer breaks aliasing rules..." |
369 | * thus we cast to (void*) */ |
370 | if (pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void*)&pamuser) != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
371 | failed_msg = "get_item(USER)"; |
372 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
373 | } |
374 | if (!pamuser || !pamuser[0]) |
375 | goto auth_failed; |
376 | safe_strncpy(username, pamuser, sizeof(username)); |
377 | /* Don't use "pw = getpwnam(username);", |
378 | * PAM is said to be capable of destroying static storage |
379 | * used by getpwnam(). We are using safe(r) function */ |
380 | pw = NULL; |
381 | getpwnam_r(username, &pwdstruct, pwdbuf, sizeof(pwdbuf), &pw); |
382 | if (!pw) |
383 | goto auth_failed; |
384 | pamret = pam_open_session(pamh, 0); |
385 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
386 | failed_msg = "open_session"; |
387 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
388 | } |
389 | pamret = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED); |
390 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
391 | failed_msg = "setcred"; |
392 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
393 | } |
394 | break; /* success, continue login process */ |
395 | |
396 | pam_auth_failed: |
397 | /* syslog, because we don't want potential attacker |
398 | * to know _why_ login failed */ |
399 | syslog(LOG_WARNING, "pam_%s call failed: %s (%d)", failed_msg, |
400 | pam_strerror(pamh, pamret), pamret); |
401 | safe_strncpy(username, "UNKNOWN", sizeof(username)); |
402 | #else /* not PAM */ |
403 | pw = safegetpwnam(username); |
404 | if (!pw) { |
405 | strcpy(username, "UNKNOWN"); |
406 | goto fake_it; |
407 | } |
408 | |
409 | if (pw->pw_passwd[0] == '!' || pw->pw_passwd[0] == '*') |
410 | goto auth_failed; |
411 | |
412 | if (opt & LOGIN_OPT_f) |
413 | break; /* -f USER: success without asking passwd */ |
414 | |
415 | if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && !check_securetty(short_tty)) |
416 | goto auth_failed; |
417 | |
418 | /* Don't check the password if password entry is empty (!) */ |
419 | if (!pw->pw_passwd[0]) |
420 | break; |
421 | fake_it: |
422 | /* Password reading and authorization takes place here. |
423 | * Note that reads (in no-echo mode) trash tty attributes. |
424 | * If we get interrupted by SIGALRM, we need to restore attrs. |
425 | */ |
426 | if (ask_and_check_password(pw) > 0) |
427 | break; |
428 | #endif /* ENABLE_PAM */ |
429 | auth_failed: |
430 | opt &= ~LOGIN_OPT_f; |
431 | bb_do_delay(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY); |
432 | /* TODO: doesn't sound like correct English phrase to me */ |
433 | puts("Login incorrect"); |
434 | if (++count == 3) { |
435 | syslog(LOG_WARNING, "invalid password for '%s'%s", |
436 | username, fromhost); |
437 | |
438 | if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP) |
439 | free(fromhost); |
440 | |
441 | return EXIT_FAILURE; |
442 | } |
443 | username[0] = '\0'; |
444 | } /* while (1) */ |
445 | |
446 | alarm(0); |
447 | /* We can ignore /etc/nologin if we are logging in as root, |
448 | * it doesn't matter whether we are run by root or not */ |
449 | if (pw->pw_uid != 0) |
450 | die_if_nologin(); |
451 | |
452 | #if ENABLE_LOGIN_SESSION_AS_CHILD |
453 | child_pid = vfork(); |
454 | if (child_pid != 0) { |
455 | if (child_pid < 0) |
456 | bb_perror_msg("vfork"); |
457 | else { |
458 | if (safe_waitpid(child_pid, NULL, 0) == -1) |
459 | bb_perror_msg("waitpid"); |
460 | update_utmp(child_pid, DEAD_PROCESS, NULL, NULL, NULL); |
461 | } |
462 | IF_PAM(login_pam_end(pamh);) |
463 | return 0; |
464 | } |
465 | #endif |
466 | |
467 | IF_SELINUX(initselinux(username, full_tty, &user_sid);) |
468 | |
469 | /* Try these, but don't complain if they fail. |
470 | * _f_chown is safe wrt race t=ttyname(0);...;chown(t); */ |
471 | fchown(0, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid); |
472 | fchmod(0, 0600); |
473 | |
474 | update_utmp(getpid(), USER_PROCESS, short_tty, username, run_by_root ? opt_host : NULL); |
475 | |
476 | /* We trust environment only if we run by root */ |
477 | if (ENABLE_LOGIN_SCRIPTS && run_by_root) |
478 | run_login_script(pw, full_tty); |
479 | |
480 | change_identity(pw); |
481 | setup_environment(pw->pw_shell, |
482 | (!(opt & LOGIN_OPT_p) * SETUP_ENV_CLEARENV) + SETUP_ENV_CHANGEENV, |
483 | pw); |
484 | |
485 | #if ENABLE_PAM |
486 | /* Modules such as pam_env will setup the PAM environment, |
487 | * which should be copied into the new environment. */ |
488 | pamenv = pam_getenvlist(pamh); |
489 | if (pamenv) while (*pamenv) { |
490 | putenv(*pamenv); |
491 | pamenv++; |
492 | } |
493 | #endif |
494 | |
495 | motd(); |
496 | |
497 | if (pw->pw_uid == 0) |
498 | syslog(LOG_INFO, "root login%s", fromhost); |
499 | |
500 | if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP) |
501 | free(fromhost); |
502 | |
503 | /* well, a simple setexeccon() here would do the job as well, |
504 | * but let's play the game for now */ |
505 | IF_SELINUX(set_current_security_context(user_sid);) |
506 | |
507 | // util-linux login also does: |
508 | // /* start new session */ |
509 | // setsid(); |
510 | // /* TIOCSCTTY: steal tty from other process group */ |
511 | // if (ioctl(0, TIOCSCTTY, 1)) error_msg... |
512 | // BBox login used to do this (see above): |
513 | // bb_setpgrp(); |
514 | // If this stuff is really needed, add it and explain why! |
515 | |
516 | /* Set signals to defaults */ |
517 | /* Non-ignored signals revert to SIG_DFL on exec anyway */ |
518 | /*signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);*/ |
519 | |
520 | /* Is this correct? This way user can ctrl-c out of /etc/profile, |
521 | * potentially creating security breach (tested with bash 3.0). |
522 | * But without this, bash 3.0 will not enable ctrl-c either. |
523 | * Maybe bash is buggy? |
524 | * Need to find out what standards say about /bin/login - |
525 | * should we leave SIGINT etc enabled or disabled? */ |
526 | signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); |
527 | |
528 | /* Exec login shell with no additional parameters */ |
529 | run_shell(pw->pw_shell, 1, NULL, NULL); |
530 | |
531 | /* return EXIT_FAILURE; - not reached */ |
532 | } |
533 |