blob: 3ca8213bb98b6efe09d04f8f23d4535c33a843f1
1 | /* vi: set sw=4 ts=4: */ |
2 | /* |
3 | * Licensed under GPLv2 or later, see file LICENSE in this source tree. |
4 | */ |
5 | //config:config LOGIN |
6 | //config: bool "login" |
7 | //config: default y |
8 | //config: select FEATURE_SYSLOG |
9 | //config: help |
10 | //config: login is used when signing onto a system. |
11 | //config: |
12 | //config: Note that Busybox binary must be setuid root for this applet to |
13 | //config: work properly. |
14 | //config: |
15 | //config:config LOGIN_SESSION_AS_CHILD |
16 | //config: bool "Run logged in session in a child process" |
17 | //config: default y if PAM |
18 | //config: depends on LOGIN |
19 | //config: help |
20 | //config: Run the logged in session in a child process. This allows |
21 | //config: login to clean up things such as utmp entries or PAM sessions |
22 | //config: when the login session is complete. If you use PAM, you |
23 | //config: almost always would want this to be set to Y, else PAM session |
24 | //config: will not be cleaned up. |
25 | //config: |
26 | //config:config LOGIN_SCRIPTS |
27 | //config: bool "Support for login scripts" |
28 | //config: depends on LOGIN |
29 | //config: default y |
30 | //config: help |
31 | //config: Enable this if you want login to execute $LOGIN_PRE_SUID_SCRIPT |
32 | //config: just prior to switching from root to logged-in user. |
33 | //config: |
34 | //config:config FEATURE_NOLOGIN |
35 | //config: bool "Support for /etc/nologin" |
36 | //config: default y |
37 | //config: depends on LOGIN |
38 | //config: help |
39 | //config: The file /etc/nologin is used by (some versions of) login(1). |
40 | //config: If it exists, non-root logins are prohibited. |
41 | //config: |
42 | //config:config FEATURE_SECURETTY |
43 | //config: bool "Support for /etc/securetty" |
44 | //config: default y |
45 | //config: depends on LOGIN |
46 | //config: help |
47 | //config: The file /etc/securetty is used by (some versions of) login(1). |
48 | //config: The file contains the device names of tty lines (one per line, |
49 | //config: without leading /dev/) on which root is allowed to login. |
50 | |
51 | //applet:/* Needs to be run by root or be suid root - needs to change uid and gid: */ |
52 | //applet:IF_LOGIN(APPLET(login, BB_DIR_BIN, BB_SUID_REQUIRE)) |
53 | |
54 | //kbuild:lib-$(CONFIG_LOGIN) += login.o |
55 | |
56 | //usage:#define login_trivial_usage |
57 | //usage: "[-p] [-h HOST] [[-f] USER]" |
58 | //usage:#define login_full_usage "\n\n" |
59 | //usage: "Begin a new session on the system\n" |
60 | //usage: "\n -f Don't authenticate (user already authenticated)" |
61 | //usage: "\n -h HOST Host user came from (for network logins)" |
62 | //usage: "\n -p Preserve environment" |
63 | |
64 | #include "libbb.h" |
65 | #include "common_bufsiz.h" |
66 | #include <syslog.h> |
67 | #include <sys/resource.h> |
68 | |
69 | #if ENABLE_SELINUX |
70 | # include <selinux/selinux.h> /* for is_selinux_enabled() */ |
71 | # include <selinux/get_context_list.h> /* for get_default_context() */ |
72 | # /* from deprecated <selinux/flask.h>: */ |
73 | # undef SECCLASS_CHR_FILE |
74 | # define SECCLASS_CHR_FILE 10 |
75 | #endif |
76 | |
77 | #if ENABLE_PAM |
78 | /* PAM may include <locale.h>. We may need to undefine bbox's stub define: */ |
79 | # undef setlocale |
80 | /* For some obscure reason, PAM is not in pam/xxx, but in security/xxx. |
81 | * Apparently they like to confuse people. */ |
82 | # include <security/pam_appl.h> |
83 | # include <security/pam_misc.h> |
84 | |
85 | # if 0 |
86 | /* This supposedly can be used to avoid double password prompt, |
87 | * if used instead of standard misc_conv(): |
88 | * |
89 | * "When we want to authenticate first with local method and then with tacacs for example, |
90 | * the password is asked for local method and if not good is asked a second time for tacacs. |
91 | * So if we want to authenticate a user with tacacs, and the user exists localy, the password is |
92 | * asked two times before authentication is accepted." |
93 | * |
94 | * However, code looks shaky. For example, why misc_conv() return value is ignored? |
95 | * Are msg[i] and resp[i] indexes handled correctly? |
96 | */ |
97 | static char *passwd = NULL; |
98 | static int my_conv(int num_msg, const struct pam_message **msg, |
99 | struct pam_response **resp, void *data) |
100 | { |
101 | int i; |
102 | for (i = 0; i < num_msg; i++) { |
103 | switch (msg[i]->msg_style) { |
104 | case PAM_PROMPT_ECHO_OFF: |
105 | if (passwd == NULL) { |
106 | misc_conv(num_msg, msg, resp, data); |
107 | passwd = xstrdup(resp[i]->resp); |
108 | return PAM_SUCCESS; |
109 | } |
110 | |
111 | resp[0] = xzalloc(sizeof(struct pam_response)); |
112 | resp[0]->resp = passwd; |
113 | passwd = NULL; |
114 | resp[0]->resp_retcode = PAM_SUCCESS; |
115 | resp[1] = NULL; |
116 | return PAM_SUCCESS; |
117 | |
118 | default: |
119 | break; |
120 | } |
121 | } |
122 | |
123 | return PAM_SUCCESS; |
124 | } |
125 | # endif |
126 | |
127 | static const struct pam_conv conv = { |
128 | misc_conv, |
129 | NULL |
130 | }; |
131 | #endif |
132 | |
133 | enum { |
134 | TIMEOUT = 60, |
135 | EMPTY_USERNAME_COUNT = 10, |
136 | /* Some users found 32 chars limit to be too low: */ |
137 | USERNAME_SIZE = 64, |
138 | TTYNAME_SIZE = 32, |
139 | }; |
140 | |
141 | struct globals { |
142 | struct termios tty_attrs; |
143 | } FIX_ALIASING; |
144 | #define G (*(struct globals*)bb_common_bufsiz1) |
145 | #define INIT_G() do { setup_common_bufsiz(); } while (0) |
146 | |
147 | |
148 | #if ENABLE_FEATURE_NOLOGIN |
149 | static void die_if_nologin(void) |
150 | { |
151 | FILE *fp; |
152 | int c; |
153 | int empty = 1; |
154 | |
155 | fp = fopen_for_read("/etc/nologin"); |
156 | if (!fp) /* assuming it does not exist */ |
157 | return; |
158 | |
159 | while ((c = getc(fp)) != EOF) { |
160 | if (c == '\n') |
161 | bb_putchar('\r'); |
162 | bb_putchar(c); |
163 | empty = 0; |
164 | } |
165 | if (empty) |
166 | puts("\r\nSystem closed for routine maintenance\r"); |
167 | |
168 | fclose(fp); |
169 | fflush_all(); |
170 | /* Users say that they do need this prior to exit: */ |
171 | tcdrain(STDOUT_FILENO); |
172 | exit(EXIT_FAILURE); |
173 | } |
174 | #else |
175 | # define die_if_nologin() ((void)0) |
176 | #endif |
177 | |
178 | #if ENABLE_FEATURE_SECURETTY && !ENABLE_PAM |
179 | static int check_securetty(const char *short_tty) |
180 | { |
181 | char *buf = (char*)"/etc/securetty"; /* any non-NULL is ok */ |
182 | parser_t *parser = config_open2("/etc/securetty", fopen_for_read); |
183 | while (config_read(parser, &buf, 1, 1, "# \t", PARSE_NORMAL)) { |
184 | if (strcmp(buf, short_tty) == 0) |
185 | break; |
186 | buf = NULL; |
187 | } |
188 | config_close(parser); |
189 | /* buf != NULL here if config file was not found, empty |
190 | * or line was found which equals short_tty */ |
191 | return buf != NULL; |
192 | } |
193 | #else |
194 | static ALWAYS_INLINE int check_securetty(const char *short_tty UNUSED_PARAM) { return 1; } |
195 | #endif |
196 | |
197 | #if ENABLE_SELINUX |
198 | static void initselinux(char *username, char *full_tty, |
199 | security_context_t *user_sid) |
200 | { |
201 | security_context_t old_tty_sid, new_tty_sid; |
202 | |
203 | if (!is_selinux_enabled()) |
204 | return; |
205 | |
206 | if (get_default_context(username, NULL, user_sid)) { |
207 | bb_error_msg_and_die("can't get SID for %s", username); |
208 | } |
209 | if (getfilecon(full_tty, &old_tty_sid) < 0) { |
210 | bb_perror_msg_and_die("getfilecon(%s) failed", full_tty); |
211 | } |
212 | if (security_compute_relabel(*user_sid, old_tty_sid, |
213 | SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_sid) != 0) { |
214 | bb_perror_msg_and_die("security_change_sid(%s) failed", full_tty); |
215 | } |
216 | if (setfilecon(full_tty, new_tty_sid) != 0) { |
217 | bb_perror_msg_and_die("chsid(%s, %s) failed", full_tty, new_tty_sid); |
218 | } |
219 | } |
220 | #endif |
221 | |
222 | #if ENABLE_LOGIN_SCRIPTS |
223 | static void run_login_script(struct passwd *pw, char *full_tty) |
224 | { |
225 | char *t_argv[2]; |
226 | |
227 | t_argv[0] = getenv("LOGIN_PRE_SUID_SCRIPT"); |
228 | if (t_argv[0]) { |
229 | t_argv[1] = NULL; |
230 | xsetenv("LOGIN_TTY", full_tty); |
231 | xsetenv("LOGIN_USER", pw->pw_name); |
232 | xsetenv("LOGIN_UID", utoa(pw->pw_uid)); |
233 | xsetenv("LOGIN_GID", utoa(pw->pw_gid)); |
234 | xsetenv("LOGIN_SHELL", pw->pw_shell); |
235 | spawn_and_wait(t_argv); /* NOMMU-friendly */ |
236 | unsetenv("LOGIN_TTY"); |
237 | unsetenv("LOGIN_USER"); |
238 | unsetenv("LOGIN_UID"); |
239 | unsetenv("LOGIN_GID"); |
240 | unsetenv("LOGIN_SHELL"); |
241 | } |
242 | } |
243 | #else |
244 | void run_login_script(struct passwd *pw, char *full_tty); |
245 | #endif |
246 | |
247 | #if ENABLE_LOGIN_SESSION_AS_CHILD && ENABLE_PAM |
248 | static void login_pam_end(pam_handle_t *pamh) |
249 | { |
250 | int pamret; |
251 | |
252 | pamret = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_DELETE_CRED); |
253 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
254 | bb_error_msg("pam_%s failed: %s (%d)", "setcred", |
255 | pam_strerror(pamh, pamret), pamret); |
256 | } |
257 | pamret = pam_close_session(pamh, 0); |
258 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
259 | bb_error_msg("pam_%s failed: %s (%d)", "close_session", |
260 | pam_strerror(pamh, pamret), pamret); |
261 | } |
262 | pamret = pam_end(pamh, pamret); |
263 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
264 | bb_error_msg("pam_%s failed: %s (%d)", "end", |
265 | pam_strerror(pamh, pamret), pamret); |
266 | } |
267 | } |
268 | #endif /* ENABLE_PAM */ |
269 | |
270 | static void get_username_or_die(char *buf, int size_buf) |
271 | { |
272 | int c, cntdown; |
273 | |
274 | cntdown = EMPTY_USERNAME_COUNT; |
275 | prompt: |
276 | print_login_prompt(); |
277 | /* skip whitespace */ |
278 | do { |
279 | c = getchar(); |
280 | if (c == EOF) |
281 | exit(EXIT_FAILURE); |
282 | if (c == '\n') { |
283 | if (!--cntdown) |
284 | exit(EXIT_FAILURE); |
285 | goto prompt; |
286 | } |
287 | } while (isspace(c)); /* maybe isblank? */ |
288 | |
289 | *buf++ = c; |
290 | if (!fgets(buf, size_buf-2, stdin)) |
291 | exit(EXIT_FAILURE); |
292 | if (!strchr(buf, '\n')) |
293 | exit(EXIT_FAILURE); |
294 | while ((unsigned char)*buf > ' ') |
295 | buf++; |
296 | *buf = '\0'; |
297 | } |
298 | |
299 | static void motd(void) |
300 | { |
301 | int fd; |
302 | |
303 | fd = open(bb_path_motd_file, O_RDONLY); |
304 | if (fd >= 0) { |
305 | fflush_all(); |
306 | bb_copyfd_eof(fd, STDOUT_FILENO); |
307 | close(fd); |
308 | } |
309 | } |
310 | |
311 | static void alarm_handler(int sig UNUSED_PARAM) |
312 | { |
313 | /* This is the escape hatch! Poor serial line users and the like |
314 | * arrive here when their connection is broken. |
315 | * We don't want to block here */ |
316 | ndelay_on(STDOUT_FILENO); |
317 | /* Test for correct attr restoring: |
318 | * run "getty 0 -" from a shell, enter bogus username, stop at |
319 | * password prompt, let it time out. Without the tcsetattr below, |
320 | * when you are back at shell prompt, echo will be still off. |
321 | */ |
322 | tcsetattr_stdin_TCSANOW(&G.tty_attrs); |
323 | printf("\r\nLogin timed out after %u seconds\r\n", TIMEOUT); |
324 | fflush_all(); |
325 | /* unix API is brain damaged regarding O_NONBLOCK, |
326 | * we should undo it, or else we can affect other processes */ |
327 | ndelay_off(STDOUT_FILENO); |
328 | _exit(EXIT_SUCCESS); |
329 | } |
330 | |
331 | int login_main(int argc, char **argv) MAIN_EXTERNALLY_VISIBLE; |
332 | int login_main(int argc UNUSED_PARAM, char **argv) |
333 | { |
334 | enum { |
335 | LOGIN_OPT_f = (1<<0), |
336 | LOGIN_OPT_h = (1<<1), |
337 | LOGIN_OPT_p = (1<<2), |
338 | }; |
339 | char *fromhost; |
340 | char username[USERNAME_SIZE]; |
341 | int run_by_root; |
342 | unsigned opt; |
343 | int count = 0; |
344 | struct passwd *pw; |
345 | char *opt_host = NULL; |
346 | char *opt_user = opt_user; /* for compiler */ |
347 | char *full_tty; |
348 | char *short_tty; |
349 | IF_SELINUX(security_context_t user_sid = NULL;) |
350 | #if ENABLE_PAM |
351 | int pamret; |
352 | pam_handle_t *pamh; |
353 | const char *pamuser; |
354 | const char *failed_msg; |
355 | struct passwd pwdstruct; |
356 | char pwdbuf[256]; |
357 | char **pamenv; |
358 | #endif |
359 | #if ENABLE_LOGIN_SESSION_AS_CHILD |
360 | pid_t child_pid; |
361 | #endif |
362 | |
363 | INIT_G(); |
364 | |
365 | /* More of suid paranoia if called by non-root: */ |
366 | /* Clear dangerous stuff, set PATH */ |
367 | run_by_root = !sanitize_env_if_suid(); |
368 | |
369 | /* Mandatory paranoia for suid applet: |
370 | * ensure that fd# 0,1,2 are opened (at least to /dev/null) |
371 | * and any extra open fd's are closed. |
372 | * (The name of the function is misleading. Not daemonizing here.) */ |
373 | bb_daemonize_or_rexec(DAEMON_ONLY_SANITIZE | DAEMON_CLOSE_EXTRA_FDS, NULL); |
374 | |
375 | username[0] = '\0'; |
376 | opt = getopt32(argv, "f:h:p", &opt_user, &opt_host); |
377 | if (opt & LOGIN_OPT_f) { |
378 | if (!run_by_root) |
379 | bb_error_msg_and_die("-f is for root only"); |
380 | safe_strncpy(username, opt_user, sizeof(username)); |
381 | } |
382 | argv += optind; |
383 | if (argv[0]) /* user from command line (getty) */ |
384 | safe_strncpy(username, argv[0], sizeof(username)); |
385 | |
386 | /* Save tty attributes - and by doing it, check that it's indeed a tty */ |
387 | if (tcgetattr(STDIN_FILENO, &G.tty_attrs) < 0 |
388 | || !isatty(STDOUT_FILENO) |
389 | /*|| !isatty(STDERR_FILENO) - no, guess some people might want to redirect this */ |
390 | ) { |
391 | return EXIT_FAILURE; /* Must be a terminal */ |
392 | } |
393 | |
394 | /* We install timeout handler only _after_ we saved G.tty_attrs */ |
395 | signal(SIGALRM, alarm_handler); |
396 | alarm(TIMEOUT); |
397 | |
398 | /* Find out and memorize our tty name */ |
399 | full_tty = xmalloc_ttyname(STDIN_FILENO); |
400 | if (!full_tty) |
401 | full_tty = xstrdup("UNKNOWN"); |
402 | short_tty = skip_dev_pfx(full_tty); |
403 | |
404 | if (opt_host) { |
405 | fromhost = xasprintf(" on '%s' from '%s'", short_tty, opt_host); |
406 | } else { |
407 | fromhost = xasprintf(" on '%s'", short_tty); |
408 | } |
409 | |
410 | /* Was breaking "login <username>" from shell command line: */ |
411 | /*bb_setpgrp();*/ |
412 | |
413 | openlog(applet_name, LOG_PID | LOG_CONS, LOG_AUTH); |
414 | |
415 | while (1) { |
416 | /* flush away any type-ahead (as getty does) */ |
417 | tcflush(0, TCIFLUSH); |
418 | |
419 | if (!username[0]) |
420 | get_username_or_die(username, sizeof(username)); |
421 | |
422 | #if ENABLE_PAM |
423 | pamret = pam_start("login", username, &conv, &pamh); |
424 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
425 | failed_msg = "start"; |
426 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
427 | } |
428 | /* set TTY (so things like securetty work) */ |
429 | pamret = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_TTY, short_tty); |
430 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
431 | failed_msg = "set_item(TTY)"; |
432 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
433 | } |
434 | /* set RHOST */ |
435 | if (opt_host) { |
436 | pamret = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_RHOST, opt_host); |
437 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
438 | failed_msg = "set_item(RHOST)"; |
439 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
440 | } |
441 | } |
442 | if (!(opt & LOGIN_OPT_f)) { |
443 | pamret = pam_authenticate(pamh, 0); |
444 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
445 | failed_msg = "authenticate"; |
446 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
447 | /* TODO: or just "goto auth_failed" |
448 | * since user seems to enter wrong password |
449 | * (in this case pamret == 7) |
450 | */ |
451 | } |
452 | } |
453 | /* check that the account is healthy */ |
454 | pamret = pam_acct_mgmt(pamh, 0); |
455 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
456 | failed_msg = "acct_mgmt"; |
457 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
458 | } |
459 | /* read user back */ |
460 | pamuser = NULL; |
461 | /* gcc: "dereferencing type-punned pointer breaks aliasing rules..." |
462 | * thus we cast to (void*) */ |
463 | if (pam_get_item(pamh, PAM_USER, (void*)&pamuser) != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
464 | failed_msg = "get_item(USER)"; |
465 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
466 | } |
467 | if (!pamuser || !pamuser[0]) |
468 | goto auth_failed; |
469 | safe_strncpy(username, pamuser, sizeof(username)); |
470 | /* Don't use "pw = getpwnam(username);", |
471 | * PAM is said to be capable of destroying static storage |
472 | * used by getpwnam(). We are using safe(r) function */ |
473 | pw = NULL; |
474 | getpwnam_r(username, &pwdstruct, pwdbuf, sizeof(pwdbuf), &pw); |
475 | if (!pw) |
476 | goto auth_failed; |
477 | pamret = pam_open_session(pamh, 0); |
478 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
479 | failed_msg = "open_session"; |
480 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
481 | } |
482 | pamret = pam_setcred(pamh, PAM_ESTABLISH_CRED); |
483 | if (pamret != PAM_SUCCESS) { |
484 | failed_msg = "setcred"; |
485 | goto pam_auth_failed; |
486 | } |
487 | break; /* success, continue login process */ |
488 | |
489 | pam_auth_failed: |
490 | /* syslog, because we don't want potential attacker |
491 | * to know _why_ login failed */ |
492 | syslog(LOG_WARNING, "pam_%s call failed: %s (%d)", failed_msg, |
493 | pam_strerror(pamh, pamret), pamret); |
494 | safe_strncpy(username, "UNKNOWN", sizeof(username)); |
495 | #else /* not PAM */ |
496 | pw = getpwnam(username); |
497 | if (!pw) { |
498 | strcpy(username, "UNKNOWN"); |
499 | goto fake_it; |
500 | } |
501 | |
502 | if (pw->pw_passwd[0] == '!' || pw->pw_passwd[0] == '*') |
503 | goto auth_failed; |
504 | |
505 | if (opt & LOGIN_OPT_f) |
506 | break; /* -f USER: success without asking passwd */ |
507 | |
508 | if (pw->pw_uid == 0 && !check_securetty(short_tty)) |
509 | goto auth_failed; |
510 | |
511 | /* Don't check the password if password entry is empty (!) */ |
512 | if (!pw->pw_passwd[0]) |
513 | break; |
514 | fake_it: |
515 | /* Password reading and authorization takes place here. |
516 | * Note that reads (in no-echo mode) trash tty attributes. |
517 | * If we get interrupted by SIGALRM, we need to restore attrs. |
518 | */ |
519 | if (ask_and_check_password(pw) > 0) |
520 | break; |
521 | #endif /* ENABLE_PAM */ |
522 | auth_failed: |
523 | opt &= ~LOGIN_OPT_f; |
524 | bb_do_delay(LOGIN_FAIL_DELAY); |
525 | /* TODO: doesn't sound like correct English phrase to me */ |
526 | puts("Login incorrect"); |
527 | if (++count == 3) { |
528 | syslog(LOG_WARNING, "invalid password for '%s'%s", |
529 | username, fromhost); |
530 | |
531 | if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP) |
532 | free(fromhost); |
533 | |
534 | return EXIT_FAILURE; |
535 | } |
536 | username[0] = '\0'; |
537 | } /* while (1) */ |
538 | |
539 | alarm(0); |
540 | /* We can ignore /etc/nologin if we are logging in as root, |
541 | * it doesn't matter whether we are run by root or not */ |
542 | if (pw->pw_uid != 0) |
543 | die_if_nologin(); |
544 | |
545 | #if ENABLE_LOGIN_SESSION_AS_CHILD |
546 | child_pid = vfork(); |
547 | if (child_pid != 0) { |
548 | if (child_pid < 0) |
549 | bb_perror_msg("vfork"); |
550 | else { |
551 | if (safe_waitpid(child_pid, NULL, 0) == -1) |
552 | bb_perror_msg("waitpid"); |
553 | update_utmp_DEAD_PROCESS(child_pid); |
554 | } |
555 | IF_PAM(login_pam_end(pamh);) |
556 | return 0; |
557 | } |
558 | #endif |
559 | |
560 | IF_SELINUX(initselinux(username, full_tty, &user_sid);) |
561 | |
562 | /* Try these, but don't complain if they fail. |
563 | * _f_chown is safe wrt race t=ttyname(0);...;chown(t); */ |
564 | fchown(0, pw->pw_uid, pw->pw_gid); |
565 | fchmod(0, 0600); |
566 | |
567 | update_utmp(getpid(), USER_PROCESS, short_tty, username, run_by_root ? opt_host : NULL); |
568 | |
569 | /* We trust environment only if we run by root */ |
570 | if (ENABLE_LOGIN_SCRIPTS && run_by_root) |
571 | run_login_script(pw, full_tty); |
572 | |
573 | change_identity(pw); |
574 | setup_environment(pw->pw_shell, |
575 | (!(opt & LOGIN_OPT_p) * SETUP_ENV_CLEARENV) + SETUP_ENV_CHANGEENV, |
576 | pw); |
577 | |
578 | #if ENABLE_PAM |
579 | /* Modules such as pam_env will setup the PAM environment, |
580 | * which should be copied into the new environment. */ |
581 | pamenv = pam_getenvlist(pamh); |
582 | if (pamenv) while (*pamenv) { |
583 | putenv(*pamenv); |
584 | pamenv++; |
585 | } |
586 | #endif |
587 | |
588 | if (access(".hushlogin", F_OK) != 0) |
589 | motd(); |
590 | |
591 | if (pw->pw_uid == 0) |
592 | syslog(LOG_INFO, "root login%s", fromhost); |
593 | |
594 | if (ENABLE_FEATURE_CLEAN_UP) |
595 | free(fromhost); |
596 | |
597 | /* well, a simple setexeccon() here would do the job as well, |
598 | * but let's play the game for now */ |
599 | IF_SELINUX(set_current_security_context(user_sid);) |
600 | |
601 | // util-linux login also does: |
602 | // /* start new session */ |
603 | // setsid(); |
604 | // /* TIOCSCTTY: steal tty from other process group */ |
605 | // if (ioctl(0, TIOCSCTTY, 1)) error_msg... |
606 | // BBox login used to do this (see above): |
607 | // bb_setpgrp(); |
608 | // If this stuff is really needed, add it and explain why! |
609 | |
610 | /* Set signals to defaults */ |
611 | /* Non-ignored signals revert to SIG_DFL on exec anyway */ |
612 | /*signal(SIGALRM, SIG_DFL);*/ |
613 | |
614 | /* Is this correct? This way user can ctrl-c out of /etc/profile, |
615 | * potentially creating security breach (tested with bash 3.0). |
616 | * But without this, bash 3.0 will not enable ctrl-c either. |
617 | * Maybe bash is buggy? |
618 | * Need to find out what standards say about /bin/login - |
619 | * should we leave SIGINT etc enabled or disabled? */ |
620 | signal(SIGINT, SIG_DFL); |
621 | |
622 | /* Exec login shell with no additional parameters */ |
623 | run_shell(pw->pw_shell, 1, NULL); |
624 | |
625 | /* return EXIT_FAILURE; - not reached */ |
626 | } |
627 |