blob: dcecc1697347e21917294bdebc62ff3d180854fb
1 | /* |
2 | * Copyright (C) 2016 The Android Open Source Project |
3 | * |
4 | * Permission is hereby granted, free of charge, to any person |
5 | * obtaining a copy of this software and associated documentation |
6 | * files (the "Software"), to deal in the Software without |
7 | * restriction, including without limitation the rights to use, copy, |
8 | * modify, merge, publish, distribute, sublicense, and/or sell copies |
9 | * of the Software, and to permit persons to whom the Software is |
10 | * furnished to do so, subject to the following conditions: |
11 | * |
12 | * The above copyright notice and this permission notice shall be |
13 | * included in all copies or substantial portions of the Software. |
14 | * |
15 | * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS", WITHOUT WARRANTY OF ANY KIND, |
16 | * EXPRESS OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO THE WARRANTIES OF |
17 | * MERCHANTABILITY, FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE AND |
18 | * NONINFRINGEMENT. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHORS OR COPYRIGHT HOLDERS |
19 | * BE LIABLE FOR ANY CLAIM, DAMAGES OR OTHER LIABILITY, WHETHER IN AN |
20 | * ACTION OF CONTRACT, TORT OR OTHERWISE, ARISING FROM, OUT OF OR IN |
21 | * CONNECTION WITH THE SOFTWARE OR THE USE OR OTHER DEALINGS IN THE |
22 | * SOFTWARE. |
23 | */ |
24 | |
25 | /* Copyright (c) 2011 The Chromium OS Authors. All rights reserved. |
26 | * Use of this source code is governed by a BSD-style license that can be |
27 | * found in the LICENSE file. |
28 | */ |
29 | |
30 | /* Implementation of RSA signature verification which uses a pre-processed |
31 | * key for computation. The code extends libmincrypt RSA verification code to |
32 | * support multiple RSA key lengths and hash digest algorithms. |
33 | */ |
34 | |
35 | #include "avb_rsa.h" |
36 | #include "avb_sha.h" |
37 | #include "avb_util.h" |
38 | #include "avb_vbmeta_image.h" |
39 | |
40 | typedef struct Key { |
41 | unsigned int len; /* Length of n[] in number of uint32_t */ |
42 | uint32_t n0inv; /* -1 / n[0] mod 2^32 */ |
43 | uint32_t* n; /* modulus as array (host-byte order) */ |
44 | uint32_t* rr; /* R^2 as array (host-byte order) */ |
45 | } Key; |
46 | |
47 | Key* parse_key_data(const uint8_t* data, size_t length) { |
48 | AvbRSAPublicKeyHeader h; |
49 | Key* key = NULL; |
50 | size_t expected_length; |
51 | unsigned int i; |
52 | const uint8_t* n; |
53 | const uint8_t* rr; |
54 | |
55 | if (!avb_rsa_public_key_header_validate_and_byteswap( |
56 | (const AvbRSAPublicKeyHeader*)data, &h)) { |
57 | avb_error("Invalid key.\n"); |
58 | goto fail; |
59 | } |
60 | |
61 | if (!(h.key_num_bits == 2048 || h.key_num_bits == 4096 || |
62 | h.key_num_bits == 8192)) { |
63 | avb_error("Unexpected key length.\n"); |
64 | goto fail; |
65 | } |
66 | |
67 | expected_length = sizeof(AvbRSAPublicKeyHeader) + 2 * h.key_num_bits / 8; |
68 | if (length != expected_length) { |
69 | avb_error("Key does not match expected length.\n"); |
70 | goto fail; |
71 | } |
72 | |
73 | n = data + sizeof(AvbRSAPublicKeyHeader); |
74 | rr = data + sizeof(AvbRSAPublicKeyHeader) + h.key_num_bits / 8; |
75 | |
76 | /* Store n and rr following the key header so we only have to do one |
77 | * allocation. |
78 | */ |
79 | key = (Key*)(avb_malloc(sizeof(Key) + 2 * h.key_num_bits / 8)); |
80 | if (key == NULL) { |
81 | goto fail; |
82 | } |
83 | |
84 | key->len = h.key_num_bits / 32; |
85 | key->n0inv = h.n0inv; |
86 | key->n = (uint32_t*)(key + 1); /* Skip ahead sizeof(Key) bytes. */ |
87 | key->rr = key->n + key->len; |
88 | |
89 | /* Crypto-code below (modpowF4() and friends) expects the key in |
90 | * little-endian format (rather than the format we're storing the |
91 | * key in), so convert it. |
92 | */ |
93 | for (i = 0; i < key->len; i++) { |
94 | key->n[i] = avb_be32toh(((uint32_t*)n)[key->len - i - 1]); |
95 | key->rr[i] = avb_be32toh(((uint32_t*)rr)[key->len - i - 1]); |
96 | } |
97 | return key; |
98 | |
99 | fail: |
100 | if (key != NULL) { |
101 | avb_free(key); |
102 | } |
103 | return NULL; |
104 | } |
105 | |
106 | void free_parsed_key(Key* key) { |
107 | avb_free(key); |
108 | } |
109 | |
110 | /* a[] -= mod */ |
111 | static void subM(const Key* key, uint32_t* a) { |
112 | int64_t A = 0; |
113 | uint32_t i; |
114 | for (i = 0; i < key->len; ++i) { |
115 | A += (uint64_t)a[i] - key->n[i]; |
116 | a[i] = (uint32_t)A; |
117 | A >>= 32; |
118 | } |
119 | } |
120 | |
121 | /* return a[] >= mod */ |
122 | static int geM(const Key* key, uint32_t* a) { |
123 | uint32_t i; |
124 | for (i = key->len; i;) { |
125 | --i; |
126 | if (a[i] < key->n[i]) { |
127 | return 0; |
128 | } |
129 | if (a[i] > key->n[i]) { |
130 | return 1; |
131 | } |
132 | } |
133 | return 1; /* equal */ |
134 | } |
135 | |
136 | /* montgomery c[] += a * b[] / R % mod */ |
137 | static void montMulAdd(const Key* key, |
138 | uint32_t* c, |
139 | const uint32_t a, |
140 | const uint32_t* b) { |
141 | uint64_t A = (uint64_t)a * b[0] + c[0]; |
142 | uint32_t d0 = (uint32_t)A * key->n0inv; |
143 | uint64_t B = (uint64_t)d0 * key->n[0] + (uint32_t)A; |
144 | uint32_t i; |
145 | |
146 | for (i = 1; i < key->len; ++i) { |
147 | A = (A >> 32) + (uint64_t)a * b[i] + c[i]; |
148 | B = (B >> 32) + (uint64_t)d0 * key->n[i] + (uint32_t)A; |
149 | c[i - 1] = (uint32_t)B; |
150 | } |
151 | |
152 | A = (A >> 32) + (B >> 32); |
153 | |
154 | c[i - 1] = (uint32_t)A; |
155 | |
156 | if (A >> 32) { |
157 | subM(key, c); |
158 | } |
159 | } |
160 | |
161 | /* montgomery c[] = a[] * b[] / R % mod */ |
162 | static void montMul(const Key* key, uint32_t* c, uint32_t* a, uint32_t* b) { |
163 | uint32_t i; |
164 | for (i = 0; i < key->len; ++i) { |
165 | c[i] = 0; |
166 | } |
167 | for (i = 0; i < key->len; ++i) { |
168 | montMulAdd(key, c, a[i], b); |
169 | } |
170 | } |
171 | |
172 | /* In-place public exponentiation. (65537} |
173 | * Input and output big-endian byte array in inout. |
174 | */ |
175 | static void modpowF4(const Key* key, uint8_t* inout) { |
176 | uint32_t* a = (uint32_t*)avb_malloc(key->len * sizeof(uint32_t)); |
177 | uint32_t* aR = (uint32_t*)avb_malloc(key->len * sizeof(uint32_t)); |
178 | uint32_t* aaR = (uint32_t*)avb_malloc(key->len * sizeof(uint32_t)); |
179 | if (a == NULL || aR == NULL || aaR == NULL) { |
180 | goto out; |
181 | } |
182 | |
183 | uint32_t* aaa = aaR; /* Re-use location. */ |
184 | int i; |
185 | |
186 | /* Convert from big endian byte array to little endian word array. */ |
187 | for (i = 0; i < (int)key->len; ++i) { |
188 | uint32_t tmp = (inout[((key->len - 1 - i) * 4) + 0] << 24) | |
189 | (inout[((key->len - 1 - i) * 4) + 1] << 16) | |
190 | (inout[((key->len - 1 - i) * 4) + 2] << 8) | |
191 | (inout[((key->len - 1 - i) * 4) + 3] << 0); |
192 | a[i] = tmp; |
193 | } |
194 | |
195 | montMul(key, aR, a, key->rr); /* aR = a * RR / R mod M */ |
196 | for (i = 0; i < 16; i += 2) { |
197 | montMul(key, aaR, aR, aR); /* aaR = aR * aR / R mod M */ |
198 | montMul(key, aR, aaR, aaR); /* aR = aaR * aaR / R mod M */ |
199 | } |
200 | montMul(key, aaa, aR, a); /* aaa = aR * a / R mod M */ |
201 | |
202 | /* Make sure aaa < mod; aaa is at most 1x mod too large. */ |
203 | if (geM(key, aaa)) { |
204 | subM(key, aaa); |
205 | } |
206 | |
207 | /* Convert to bigendian byte array */ |
208 | for (i = (int)key->len - 1; i >= 0; --i) { |
209 | uint32_t tmp = aaa[i]; |
210 | *inout++ = (uint8_t)(tmp >> 24); |
211 | *inout++ = (uint8_t)(tmp >> 16); |
212 | *inout++ = (uint8_t)(tmp >> 8); |
213 | *inout++ = (uint8_t)(tmp >> 0); |
214 | } |
215 | |
216 | out: |
217 | if (a != NULL) { |
218 | avb_free(a); |
219 | } |
220 | if (aR != NULL) { |
221 | avb_free(aR); |
222 | } |
223 | if (aaR != NULL) { |
224 | avb_free(aaR); |
225 | } |
226 | } |
227 | |
228 | /* Verify a RSA PKCS1.5 signature against an expected hash. |
229 | * Returns false on failure, true on success. |
230 | */ |
231 | bool avb_rsa_verify(const uint8_t* key, |
232 | size_t key_num_bytes, |
233 | const uint8_t* sig, |
234 | size_t sig_num_bytes, |
235 | const uint8_t* hash, |
236 | size_t hash_num_bytes, |
237 | const uint8_t* padding, |
238 | size_t padding_num_bytes) { |
239 | uint8_t* buf = NULL; |
240 | Key* parsed_key = NULL; |
241 | bool success = false; |
242 | |
243 | if (key == NULL || sig == NULL || hash == NULL || padding == NULL) { |
244 | avb_error("Invalid input.\n"); |
245 | goto out; |
246 | } |
247 | |
248 | parsed_key = parse_key_data(key, key_num_bytes); |
249 | if (parsed_key == NULL) { |
250 | avb_error("Error parsing key.\n"); |
251 | goto out; |
252 | } |
253 | |
254 | if (sig_num_bytes != (parsed_key->len * sizeof(uint32_t))) { |
255 | avb_error("Signature length does not match key length.\n"); |
256 | goto out; |
257 | } |
258 | |
259 | if (padding_num_bytes != sig_num_bytes - hash_num_bytes) { |
260 | avb_error("Padding length does not match hash and signature lengths.\n"); |
261 | goto out; |
262 | } |
263 | |
264 | buf = (uint8_t*)avb_malloc(sig_num_bytes); |
265 | if (buf == NULL) { |
266 | avb_error("Error allocating memory.\n"); |
267 | goto out; |
268 | } |
269 | avb_memcpy(buf, sig, sig_num_bytes); |
270 | |
271 | modpowF4(parsed_key, buf); |
272 | |
273 | /* Check padding bytes. |
274 | * |
275 | * Even though there are probably no timing issues here, we use |
276 | * avb_safe_memcmp() just to be on the safe side. |
277 | */ |
278 | if (avb_safe_memcmp(buf, padding, padding_num_bytes)) { |
279 | avb_error("Padding check failed.\n"); |
280 | goto out; |
281 | } |
282 | |
283 | /* Check hash. */ |
284 | if (avb_safe_memcmp(buf + padding_num_bytes, hash, hash_num_bytes)) { |
285 | avb_error("Hash check failed.\n"); |
286 | goto out; |
287 | } |
288 | |
289 | success = true; |
290 | |
291 | out: |
292 | if (parsed_key != NULL) { |
293 | free_parsed_key(parsed_key); |
294 | } |
295 | if (buf != NULL) { |
296 | avb_free(buf); |
297 | } |
298 | return success; |
299 | } |
300 |